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Abstract 
Why have the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations had so much difficulty 
implementing the Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace, and Security, 
despite the UN’s rhetorical commitment to this agenda? Activists and supporters of 
the Resolutions blame bias against gender issues, organizational inertia and a lack of 
political will in the organization itself. Influenced by international relations and 
sociological theory, I question whether organizational change and discrepancies 
between rhetoric and practice in international organizations can be explained without 
considering how stakeholders outside the organizations, and especially member states, 
influence and place restrictions on the actions of the DPKO and its staff. I try to 
explain the contradiction between rhetorical commitment and practical 
implementation through an empirical analysis of how the group responsible for 
coordinating this implementation process at the DPKO worked to change attitudes 
and practices relating to these Resolutions in their own organization and in the 
military aspects of peacekeeping missions, and what factors and actors they 
considered to be constraining or aiding them in their effort. My findings show that 
stakeholders from other parts of the UN organization, peacekeeping missions and 
especially the member states permeate the implementation process at the DPKO and 
that representatives from all these groups initially had strong reservations against 
certain aspects of the Resolutions. Advancing the agenda consequently implied 
changing attitudes, culture and practices not only within the DPKO, but also among 
the member states and military personnel in peacekeeping missions. The DPKO team 
coordinating the implementation process worked strategically to achieve this, but also 
had to rely on the efforts of allies supporting their efforts. While the team has made 
some progress, the implementation process is not yet over, and realizing 
implementation in practice will rely on the coordinated efforts of the DPKO team and 
its allies. 
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1. Introduction 
Why have the United Nations (UN) Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) 
had so much difficulty implementing the Security Council Resolutions on Women, 
Peace, and Security, despite the UN’s rhetorical commitment to this agenda? I try to 
explain this discrepancy through an empirical analysis of how the group responsible 
for coordinating this implementation process at the DPKO worked to change attitudes 
and practices relating to these Resolutions in their own organization and in the military 
aspects of peacekeeping missions, and what factors and actors they considered to be 
constraining or aiding them in their effort.  
 
1.1 Gender in War and Violent Conflict 
Understanding how violent conflict is experienced differently by men, women, girls 
and boys is important to ensure that peacekeeping efforts effectively help all parts of 
war-torn societies, by catering to the potentially different needs of men and women. 
Civilians are increasingly being targeted in violent conflicts and this violence is often 
gendered (Anderlini 2007, Carpenter 2006, Mazurana et al. 2005, Solhjell 2010); 
while women are disproportionally raped, forced into sexual slavery or prostitution, 
impregnated against their will or intentionally afflicted with HIV/AIDS and other 
sexually transmitted diseases (Mazurana et al. 2005: 2), men and adolescent boys are 
more often massacred by warring parties (Carpenter 2006). Many of the atrocities 
committed primarily against women have up until very recently been perceived as 
unavoidable by-products of war, which have resulted in lax measures to prevent 
violations and punish perpetrators. 
Gender tends to affect not only how people are victimized, but also how they 
participate in, recover and benefit from war and violent conflict (Mazurana et al. 2005: 
15). However, this is also influenced by socio-economic status, age, ethnicity and 
other factors. Moreover, the social roles and expectations ascribed to gender vary 
historically and culturally. Even so, how gender influences the experience of war is 
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often discerned through stereotypes (Carpenter 2006). Women are for instance often 
grouped together with children as passive, innocent victims of war. In reality women 
are also instigators, combatants and perpetrators in many violent conflicts (Mazurana 
et al. 2005, Carpenter 2006). A consequence of these misperceptions is that women are 
often excluded from formal decision making processes, as well as from disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration efforts aimed at former combatants in the aftermath 
of war. They are also underrepresented in high-level positions in formal decision 
making bodies directing the priorities of peacekeeping and peace-building efforts, such 
as the UN.  
To ensure that all civilians are protected in violent conflict and that the perspectives 
and experiences of both women and men are taken into account in conflict prevention 
and peace-building efforts, gender must be included as one of the variables for analysis 
and engagement in peacekeeping and peace-building efforts, a process referred to as 
gender mainstreaming (Mazurana et al. 2005, Anderini 2007). According to the 
International Labor Organization, gender mainstreaming is meant to “combat the 
direct or indirect consequences of past discrimination” of women or men by “enabling 
them to participate in and benefit equally” (Anderlini 2007: 200) from projects 
designed by, for instance, the UN. Because the violence directed primarily at women 
has until recently been largely ignored and women at the same time are barred from 
the formal fora for conflict prevention and resolution, gender mainstreaming of peace 
and security efforts focus on measures to both protect and empower women (Anderlini 
2007).  
 
1.2 Gender Mainstreaming of the Peace and Security Agenda 
As a part of the effort to gender mainstream their work within the realm of peace and 
security, the UN Security Council has adopted four Resolutions (UNSCRs) on 
Women, Peace and Security. UNSCR 1325 (2000), UNSCR 1820 (2008), UNCR 1888 
(2009) and UNSCR 1889 (2009) have all been central in placing gender perspectives 
on the international peace and security agenda. They also represent a formal 
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recognition of the distinct perils of women during war and conflict. UNSCR 1325 and 
1889 contain a wide variety of mandates aiming at protecting and empowering women 
in violent conflict and its aftermath. This includes demanding protection of all 
civilians against sexual and gender based violence and encouraging women’s 
participation in peace processes (Tryggestad 2009). UNSCR 1820 and 1888 are more 
specifically focused on combating sexual violence. For the UN, the Women, Peace, 
and Security Resolutions mean that the Resolutions’ central tenets must be included 
into all relevant procedures of the organization, which implies making changes in its 
organizational structure, practice and culture.  
The initial Resolution, UNSCR 1325, was adopted after a massive lobbying campaign 
by an international alliance of women’s, peace and human rights organizations, 
cooperating with women’s advocates within the UN system and a group of benevolent 
member states (Cockburn 2007, Tryggestad 2009). Both the Global North and South
1
 
were represented among these member states, most notably Bangladesh, Jamaica, 
Canada, Namibia and the UK (Anderlini 2007, Cockburn 2007). The Resolution was a 
significant achievement; it was the first time the UN Security Council engaged in 
gender issues. The alliance remained active after this initial victory, lobbying member 
states and the UN to implement the Resolution (Tryggestad 2009, Cockburn 2007, 
Anderlini 2007).  
 
1.3 Criticism of the UN’s Implementation Process 
Despite the three subsequent Resolutions adopted since UNSCR 1325, members of the 
advocacy network from various non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and former 
members of the UN gender staff have voiced criticism of what they see as a lack of 
effectiveness and substance characterizing the implementation process at the UN. 
They hold that while the organization continues to express a commitment to the 
Women, Peace, and Security agenda, there is a stark difference between the 
                                                
1
 The Global North denotes the socio-economically wealthy countries of the world, mostly located in the 
northern hemisphere, including countries in North America and Europe, as well as Australia and New Zealand. 
The Global South refers to the poorer countries primarily located in the southern hemisphere (Wikipedia 2010). 
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organization’s rhetoric and practice (Tryggestad 2009). This discrepancy, they argue, 
is a result of organizational inertia, the absence of institutional coherence, as well as 
bias against gender equality and a lack of political will in the organization itself (i.e. 
Raven-Roberts 2005). The critics of the implementation process, in other words, 
ascribe these problems mostly to internal characteristics of the UN.  
 
1.4 Alternative Explanations 
More general theoretical perspectives on discrepancies between rhetoric and practice 
and organizational change in International Organizations (IOs) suggest that this 
explanation is incomplete. These theoretical perspectives hold that stakeholders 
outside the organizations, and especially member states, must be included in an 
explanation of organizational change and differences between rhetoric and practice in 
IOs. Some of these theories question whether the organizations themselves have any 
influence on these kinds of processes at all. Other theoretical perspectives hold that 
IOs have some degree of autonomy and may initiate and drive organizational change. 
But while these perspectives differ on the extent to which they can work, they all agree 
that member states can influence and place restrictions on the actions of IOs and their 
staff. Several of the perspectives, however, fail to take the agency of IO staff 
sufficiently into consideration, and treat their actions as determined by either the 
interests of the member states or organizational culture. Contrastingly, the potential 
agency of UN staff in implementing the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions, 
which necessarily implies changing parts of the organization’s structure, culture and 
practice, is the primary focus of this thesis. 
 
1.5 Scope & Limitations  
When examining the process of implementing this agenda at the UN and the role of 
the organization’s staff, I have chosen to focus on just one part of the UN: the DPKO, 
and on one specific aspect of the Resolutions: the training of military peacekeepers. I 
chose this narrow focus because several of the theoretical perspectives on 
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discrepancies between rhetoric and practice in IOs argue that IOs such as the UN 
should not be analyzed as a unitary structure. The UN is comprised of numerous units 
and individuals with distinct agendas and interests and the various parts of the 
organization have different relationship with outside actors, such as member states and 
NGOs. Generalizing from the implementation process at the DPKO to other parts of 
the UN may therefore be imprudent.  
Two reasons informed the choice of the DPKO. Firstly, the DPKO is considered to 
have come the “furthest in implementing Resolution 1325” of the UN organizations 
(Tryggestad 2009). This is despite the conservative culture and low number of women 
in UN military contingents, which many of my initial informants among Norwegian 
scholars and bureaucrats argued would make implementing the Resolutions among the 
UN military contingents especially challenging. Moreover, military peacekeepers 
remain formally employed by their respective troop contributing countries (TCCs) 
while being deployed in UN peacekeeping missions. This makes the TCCs very much 
involved in the process of implementing the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions 
among military peacekeepers and makes this an illustrative point regarding if and how 
the member states direct the actions of UN staff. The DPKO is consequently a 
theoretically interesting case, as this employment structure and the level of the 
member states’ involvement could potentially limit the staff’s influence over the 
implementation process. This would make any evidence of their influence all the more 
convincing. On the other hand, the DPKO’s distinct relationship to the UN member 
states also makes it less comparable to the implementation processes in the other parts 
of the UN system. For the critics of the implementation process addressing the UN 
system as a whole, I will therefore only be able to show variation.  
The second reason for choosing the DPKO was that the implementation of the 
Resolutions in peacekeeping operations was mentioned specifically in much of the 
critical literature, which made me curious about how the implementation process 
looked from the perspective of those who were criticized. With reference to these 
critics, I will consider what and who might have influenced the implementation 
process at the DPKO and consequently whether the blame for what they consider to be 
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a slow and unsubstantial implementation process can accurately be placed only on 
internal features of the UN.  
 
1.6 Research Question 
The aim of this thesis is accordingly to understand how the effort to implement the 
Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions at the DPKO is perceived from the 
perspective of one group of the Department’s staff who work to implement this 
agenda, and how member states, other stakeholders and circumstances influence their 
efforts. One part of the implementation process at the DPKO was to create the 
DPKO/DFS Gender Guidelines
2
, which are to guide the implementation of the 
Women, Peace and Security Resolutions in the work of the UN military peacekeeping 
personnel (DPKO/DFS 2010). It is the descriptions of the formal processes and the 
perceptions of the staff working to develop the guidelines that form the primary 
empirical focus of this thesis. More specifically, how the DPKO staff perceives and 
describes the strategies they use to develop and eventually implement the guidelines, 
but also how their relationship with other actors within and without the UN system 
aids and constrains their efforts and what they see as the reason for this. Against this 
background, my empirical research questions become the following:  
• What strategies did the team responsible for coordinating the implementation of 
the Women, Peace and Security Resolutions at the DPKO employ in their effort 
to implement this agenda in the work of military peacekeepers? 
• What contextual issues and actors did they see as constraining or aiding them in 
their effort?  
 
Answering these questions will be one contribution to an explanation as to why the 
DPKO and the UN more generally have so much difficulty implementing the Women, 
Peace, and Security Resolutions, despite the organization’s rhetorical commitment to 
this agenda. However, my thesis is also meant to be a contribution to the theoretical 
                                                
2
 Interchangeably referred to as DPKO/DFS Gender Guidelines, the military gender guidelines, the gender 
guidelines or simply the guidelines. 
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debate about the role and independence of IO staff to initiate and drive organizational 
change. The empirical research question is therefore also an effort to answer a 
theoretical research question:   
• In which ways are the actions of DPKO staff influenced by the interests of 
member states and to what extent are they independent social actors? 
  
1.7 Methodology  
In order to answer my research questions, I conducted interviews with seven former 
and current members of the DPKO Gender Team and The Office of Military Affairs  
(OMA) at the UN headquarters in New York who at the time of writing were in the 
final stages of developing the DPKO/DFS Military Gender Guidelines. These were 
chosen precisely because the staff was completing them as my interviews took place, 
and their memories and opinions of the development process were still relatively fresh. 
The interviews were carried out during a research trip to New York in February/March 
2010 and later over the telephone. In addition, I interviewed eight Norwegian scholars, 
bureaucrats and diplomats working either directly with the DPKO or with the UN 
more generally on gender issues. This was both in order to gather background 
information before my research trip and in order to validate my findings from the 
interviews at the DPKO. I also analyzed the finished DPKO/DFS Gender Guidelines 
to see how thy compared to the findings from the interviews.  
 
1.8 Thesis Outline 
Following this introduction, I will present the arguments and conclusions of the critics 
of the implementation process in more detail, before introducing the DPKO and 
outline the formal structure of its relationship to member states. In chapter three I will 
put this in a wider theoretical context, based on an eclectic approach to International 
Relations (IR) theory and organizational sociology. In chapter four, I give an account 
of my methodological choices and challenges, as well as the epistemological 
foundation of this thesis, before analyzing the empirical data I have collected in 
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chapter five. I will finally discuss my findings in context of the theoretical perspectives 
and critical literature in chapter six, before stating my conclusions. 
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2. Putting Gender on the Peacekeeping Agenda: An 
Overview 
The Resolutions on Women, Peace, and Security (UNSCR 1325, 1820, 1888 and 
1889) are related to a wider effort of gender mainstreaming in the UN and its peace 
operations, which dates back two decades. The Resolutions build on earlier 
achievements such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the later UN World Conferences on 
Women. The initial Women, Peace, and Security Resolution was the result of the 
aspirations and efforts of an international alliance of women’s and human rights 
activists. The alliance was comprised of everything from large, multinational NGOs to 
local groups from war-torn societies, cooperating with personnel from various UN 
agencies and a group of benevolent member states, (Tryggestad 2009, Cockburn 2007, 
Anderlini 2007).  
After succeeding in their lobbying campaign to get gender issues on the Security 
Council’s agenda, the alliance turned its focus to promoting the implementation of the 
Women, Peace, and Security agenda at the UN and among its member states. This was 
necessary because while the member states are obliged to implement the Resolutions 
their “implementation […] cannot be enforced, and noncompliance cannot be 
penalized” (Anderlini 2007: 196). The alliance also continued their efforts to recruit 
supporters and build legitimacy around Women, Peace, and Security issues. The most 
central of the international organizations in the alliance, including Amnesty 
International, International Alert and the Women’s International League for Peace and 
Freedom, formalized this effort by forming the ”Ad Hoc Working Group on Women, 
Peace and Security”, which was to have a watchdog function with regards to the 
implementation process (Anderlini 2007).  
The alliance was successful in their effort to build support for the agenda: in the years 
after UNSCR 1325, the attention given to the Women, Peace, and Security issues from 
civil society actors and activists, UN member states and within the UN itself increased 
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notably (Anderlini 2007). Their work also resulted in the adoption of the three 
subsequent Women, Peace and Security Resolutions.  
RESOLUTIONS ON WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY 
Resolution Year Main Points Related to Peacekeeping 
UNSCR 1325 2000 
• Protecting civilians against sexual and gender based violence 
• Incorporate gender perspectives in peacekeeping  
• Women’s participation in conflict prevention, peacekeeping and 
peace-building efforts  
UNSCR 1820 2008 
• Focus specifically on combating sexual violence 
• Training programs and gender guidelines to help military and 
civilian peacekeepers to prevent and respond to sexual violence 
• Requests TCCs and PCCs to take measures against sexual 
exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers 
• TCCs and PCCs requested to deploy more female peacekeepers  
 
UNSCR1888 2009 
• Reaffirms and concretizes UNSCR 1820 
• Stresses coordination and cooperation among UN agencies 
• New Special Representative on Sexual and Gender Based Violence 
• “Women Protection Advisers” in missions where they are needed 
UNSCR 1889 2009 
• Reaffirms UNSCR 1325 
• Statement of intention to include gender issues in peacekeeping 
mandates 
• Stresses the need to gather reliable data on sexual violence and 
gender issues 
Table 2.1: Summary of the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions 
 
2.1 Outline of the Resolutions 
UNSCR 1325 has three principal goals. First, it states a commitment to women’s 
rights and highlights the need to protect civilians, especially women and girls, from 
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gender based violence, including sexual violence. Second, it stresses the importance of 
women’s participation in peacekeeping, peace-building and conflict prevention. This 
includes increasing women’s representation at all levels of the national, regional, and 
international institutions involved in these processes, such as the UN. Third, the 
resolution holds that all phases of UN peacekeeping and peace-building processes 
must incorporate a gender perspective, for instance in the training of peacekeepers and 
in disarmament, demobilization, reintegration (DDR) efforts in post-conflict countries 
(Tryggestad 2009, Cockburn 2007). To achieve this, the Security Council urges the 
member states to expand their “voluntary financial, technical and logistical support for 
gender-sensitive training efforts” (UNSCR 1325, 2000).  
The second resolution, UNSCR 1820 (2008) was, like UNSCR 1325, unanimously 
adopted and focuses specifically on combating sexual and gender based violence. 
Concerning the implementation in UN peacekeeping operations, the resolution 
requests that the responsible UN branches and relevant states “develop and implement 
appropriate training programs for all peacekeeping and humanitarian personnel”. It 
also urges the troop and police contributing countries (TCCs and PCCs) to take 
appropriate action to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers and 
inform their contingents about their responsibility to protect civilians against sexual 
violence. They are also asked to deploy more female peacekeepers if possible. The 
Resolution also requests the UN, through the Secretary General, to develop guidelines 
and strategies to aid UN peacekeepers to prevent and respond to sexual violence. 
UNSCR 1888 (2009) reaffirms many of the provisions of the previous resolution. It 
also lauds the DPKO’s efforts to develop gender guidelines for military peacekeepers 
and operational guidance to both military, civilian and police components of UN 
peacekeeping operations. The Security Council specifically encourages UN agencies 
involved in implementing the Women, Peace, and Security agenda to cooperate with 
each other. This coordination process is to be managed by a new Special 
Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict who is also mandated to advocate the 
agenda to central stakeholders, such as member states and warring parties. Margot 
Wallström was appointed to this position in January 2010 and has a two-year mandate 
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(UN Multimedia 2010). The Security Council also states an intention to include 
protection against and response to sexual violence in the mandates of peacekeeping 
operations, and to sending “women protection advisors” to peacekeeping missions 
where they are needed.  
UNSCR 1889 (2009) reaffirms the central provisions of UNSCR 1325, and stresses 
the need to gather reliable data on these issues. The Security Council furthermore 
“expresses its intention, when establishing and renewing the mandates of United 
Nations missions, to include provisions on the promotion of gender equality and the 
empowerment of women in post-conflict situations”. 
 
2.2 Criticism: Unsubstantial Resolutions and Slow Implementation 
As the Women, Peace and Security agenda gathered momentum scholars and activists 
from the NGO community, as well as proponents formerly working at the UN, have 
criticized UNSCR 1325 for being too muted in its demands and the UN for being too 
slow in implementing its central tenets.  
 
2.2.1 Criticism of the Substance of the Resolutions 
Central participants in the NGO network, such as Women’s International League for 
Peace and Freedom and scholars such as Whitworth (2004), opposed the lack of 
antimilitarist articles in the resolution and worried that rather than promoting women’s 
participation as a goal in itself and contributing to a demilitarization of UN 
peacekeeping, it would be nothing more than a tool to help the UN do its job better. 
Implementation efforts have moreover often led to stereotyping women as inherently 
peaceful and thereby invaluable to conflict resolution or prevention, cementing the 
view that women in war are only helpless victims in need of protection (Whitworth 
2004: 136). Furthermore, while calling attention to the need for gender equality, the 
resolution was considered too cautious in its demands, as it did not address “men and 
masculinity as the causes of women’s insecurity” (Felicity Hill, quoted in Cockburn 
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2007: 148). Many activists and academics criticize also the subsequent Resolutions on 
Women, Peace, and Security along similar lines. In particular, they emphasize UNSCR 
1820’s and 1888’s exclusive focus on the need for protection against sexual violence, 
without establishing strong links to empowerment as a possible source of prevention
3
.  
Other critics are more concerned with what they perceive as the slow pace of 
implementation in the UN organization. They also argue that what little progress has 
been made has needed persistent lobbying by activists within and without the UN 
system (e.g. Anderlini 2007, Porter 2007, Raven-Roberts 2005, Whitworth 2004). 
Porter (2007) is rather vague in explaining this apparent lack of progress. Other critical 
accounts often blame it on a combination of a “lack of political will and accountability 
mechanisms, along with organizational inertia and discriminatory attitudes toward 
women” (Tryggestad 2009: 541). Anderlini (2007) and Raven-Roberts (2005) offers 
the most elaborate explanations, and I will therefore go into their analysis in some 
detail below.  
 
2.2.2 Organizational Critique 
Anderlini (2007) begins by her critique of the rate of implementation by placing the 
Women, Peace and Security Resolutions in a wider context of normative, international 
questions that influence the implementation process among the member states. She 
claims that the Resolutions do not easily fit within either a “human security” paradigm 
or a more state-centric view of peace and security. The “human security” perspective 
argues that wars are now primarily intrastate conflicts, in which civilians are often the 
primary targets of the warring parties. This in turn calls for comprehensive 
international involvement in the protection of civilians and addressing the root causes 
of war and conflict. The latter perspective champions the pre-eminence of the state and 
non-intervention (Andelini 2007). She asserts that this lack of clarity impedes effective 
implementation, without referring to the criticism and resistance which “human 
                                                
3
 This was brought up by four of my informants at the DPKO, as well as two of my interviewees in Norway and 
referred to as something that divided the proponents of the Women, Peace and Security agenda. Some NGOs, 
member states and UN branches worried about portraying women as victims, while others welcomed the focus 
on sexual violence. 
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security” and the closely related “protection of civilians” agenda met with by many 
member states (i.e. Chandler 2008, Bellamy & Williams 2010). The traditional 
principles of peacekeeping holds that missions can only be deployed with the consent 
of the parties in the conflict, that peacekeepers must remain impartial and that they can 
only use force self-defense. The proponents of the ”human security” and “protection of 
civilians” paradigms argue that force must also be used against parties in the conflict if 
needed to protect other groups, such as humanitarian workers and civilians. This idea 
gained much acclaim from some member states, the NGO community and within the 
UN organization, but also faced stark opposition from member states who wanted to 
uphold the traditional peacekeeping principles. While Anderlini (2007) holds that the 
Resolutions cannot be directly linked to the “human security” paradigm, many 
member states perceived them to be, and were consequently skeptical to the Women, 
Peace, and Security Resolutions (Tryggestad 2010).  
Anderlini (2007) continues to argue against some stakeholders’ views that the 
promotion of women’s empowerment forces a Western agenda on the rest of the 
world, but concedes that there are still a lot of confusion when it comes to both 
women’s empowerment and gender mainstreaming and that this confusion hampers 
effective implementation. However, these objections are slowly becoming less 
prominent internationally as awareness about the central tenets of the Women, Peace, 
and Security Resolutions are becoming more common (Andelini 2007).  
When it comes to the implementation process at the UN, several factors hamper the 
process, according to Anderlini (2007). Gender issues are “ghettoized” by an absence 
of funding, inadequate data and a lack of coordination between different UN agencies 
working on gender mainstreaming. Dedicated personnel find themselves marginalized 
and the wider organization seldom implements or mainstreams their work. The 
commitment to the Women, Peace, and Security agenda voiced by the organization’s 
leadership is, accordingly, purely rhetorical. While Anderlini (2007) acknowledges 
that donor priorities might have an effect on the prominence and nature of measures, 
she still places most of the blame for a lack of implementation progress in the UN 
system on the organization itself. 
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Blaming the slow progress of implementation on internal features of the UN is even 
more pronounced in Raven-Robert’s (2005) analysis of gender mainstreaming in UN 
peacekeeping operations, an analysis based on her time as a program officer in the UN 
system. She begins her analysis by pointing to the conceptual coherence problem also 
highlighted by Anderlini (2007). Different branches of the UN understand concepts 
such as gender mainstreaming and peacekeeping very differently, and how well new 
concepts are received depends on how well they fit into the conceptual framework 
already in place. This has led to a marginalization of the gender agenda, especially 
within the organizations concerned with security matters, such as the DPKO. Bias 
against gender issues, based either on a lack of knowledge or outright contention, is a 
second obstacle to effective implementation. Gender mainstreaming of peacekeeping 
operations is “dismissed as trivial” (Raven-Roberts 2005: 54) by members of the 
DPKO personnel and leadership. The large presence of military personnel only 
aggravates this problem. Raven-Roberts, moreover, finds it “disturbing” that a 
“military background is somehow considered more appropriate than expertise in 
conflict resolution, peace studies, community development, international relations, or 
anthropology” (Raven-Roberts 2005: 54). A third impediment is the organizational 
structure itself. Donor funding is often short term and employment turnover is high, 
especially in field offices. Gender training is therefore a laborious and continuous 
effort. Also, commitment to gender issues is adhered to on paper, but due to 
insufficient routines for evaluation, the strategies are implemented only by those who 
think this agenda is important. The organization moreover routinely ignores criticism 
and critics from within the system are “blacklisted” and “discredited” (Raven-Roberts 
2005: 58). 
In sum, activists and scholars criticize the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions for 
not being radical enough. The UN’s commitment to implementing the Resolutions is 
moreover described as mostly rhetorical. The reasons for the apparent lack of actual 
change are explained by Anderlini (2007) and Raven-Roberts (2005) as: 1) bias 
against gender issues among UN staff, based on either ignorance or dissent; 2) 
organizational features, such as inadequate or short-term funding and high rotation of 
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personnel; 3) a lack of coordination among the different UN agencies, and 4) the 
absence of normative consensus among UN departments and member states when it 
comes to peacekeeping and gender issues. Only Anderlini (2007) includes the UN 
member states in the latter point. The UN is in other words portrayed as a static 
structure incapable of changing when it comes to gender issues. While acknowledging 
that “donor countries” have some influence, the authors mostly attribute the slow rate 
of implementation of the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions to internal features 
of the UN itself. Before commencing on the theoretical perspectives that might offer 
alternative explanations, I will introduce the organizational structure of the DPKO. 
 
2.3 The DPKO 
The implementation of the Women, Peace and Security Resolutions at the DPKO is 
only one part of the much larger process of implementing this agenda in the entire UN 
system. As the outline of the Resolutions indicated, the DPKO have a number of tasks 
in this process, mostly relating to peacekeeping operations. I focus on a specific part of 
this process, namely the recently completed DPKO/DFS Gender Guidelines (2010), 
which were developed to operationalize the Resolutions for military peacekeepers and 
complement earlier gender mainstreaming efforts at the DPKO.  In this section, I give 
a short introduction to the components of the DPKO responsible for the development 
of the guidelines and the most central parts of the formal decision making structure of 
the military components of peace keeping missions. For a full organizational map of 
the DPKO, please see appendix I of this paper. 
 
2.3.1 The Role of the DPKO in the UN system 
The DPKO is part of the UN Secretariat, lead by the Under-Secretary-General for 
Peacekeeping Operations and his office. Its formal mandate is to “plan, prepare, 
manage and direct UN peacekeeping operations…” (UN Peacekeeping 2009a). The 
Department also “provides political and executive direction to UN peacekeeping 
operations, and maintains contact with the Security Council, troop and financial 
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contributors, and parties to the conflict in the implementation of Security Council 
mandates” (UN Peacekeeping 2009a). Logistical and administrative functions of 
peacekeeping operations are the responsibility of the Department of Field Support 
(DFS), which is another subsidiary body of the UN Secretariat. The DFS is also 
responsible for conduct and discipline in peacekeeping missions, hereunder 
investigating allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers, a 
central mandate of the Women, Peace and Security Resolutions (UN peacekeeping 
2008).  
 
2.3.2 Gender at the DPKO 
The DPKO’s Best Practices Section, which is a subsidiary of the DPKO’s Policy, 
Evaluation and Training Division, is responsible for assisting in the development of 
guidelines for UN peace operations. The section employs experts in fields such as 
HIV/AIDS, human trafficking and gender, who assist the Department and 
peacekeeping missions in these areas. The Best Practices Gender Team
4
 assists the 
DPKO with the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security Resolutions (UN 
Peacekeeping 2009b). They have been responsible for developing the DPKO/DFS 
Gender Guidelines together with a small team from the DPKO’s Office of Military 
Affairs. The OMA is managed by the Military Adviser and his staff, and has three 
subdivisions (UN Peacekeeping 2009c), which in different ways work to 
operationalize and assemble the military aspects of the mandates for peace operations 
passed by the Security Council. As the UN has no standing army, this must be done 
from scratch with each new Security Council Mandate (Bellamy & Williams 2010). 
The Military Planning Service of the OMA develops concepts and plans for the 
military components of peacekeeping missions (UN Peacekeeping 2009c). They are 
also responsible for translating the military aspects of Security Council mandates into 
concrete force requirements
5
, which indicates the size and nature of the military 
component needed to carry out the mandate. These plans are then sent over to The 
                                                
4
 Hereafter referred to as the Gender Team or Gender Unit 
5
 According to one of my interviewees. 
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Force Generation Service, who is responsible for generating the military peacekeepers 
and equipment needed from member states contributing troops to UN peacekeeping 
operations, referred to as TCCs. They also negotiate the terms of deployment for each 
new peacekeeping mission (Bellamy & Williams 2010). Once the Security Council 
adopts the official mandate and the force requirement is developed, potential TCCs are 
officially invited to contribute troops and equipment through their diplomatic missions 
to the UN. Like the civilian members of UN peacekeeping mission, senior military 
officers and military observers are employed by the UN. The military troops, on the 
other hand, remain under the authority of their contributing member states while 
serving under UN operational command (Bellamy & Williams 2010). The third branch 
of the OMA is The Current Military Operations Service who monitors the 
implementation of the plans created by The Military Planning Service in ongoing 
missions (UN Peacekeeping 2009c). All three subdivisions were represented in the 
team developing the gender guidelines
6
. 
 
2.3.3 Financing and Generating Troops for Peacekeeping Missions 
The UN member states finance peacekeeping missions and their administration 
through a combination of mandatory and voluntary contributions (Bellamy & Williams 
2010). The member states review and approve the budgets of the DPKO and individual 
peacekeeping operations through the UN General Assembly’s Fifth Committee (UN 
Documentation 2010). The UN General Assembly, through the Special Committee on 
Peacekeeping Operations (C34), reviews all aspects of peacekeeping operations, 
including planning and guidelines, once a year. Member states must, in other words, 
approve all proposed changes in the DPKO’s formal structure or activity. The Special 
Committee is comprised of 144 member states, primarily former or current 
contributors of personnel and other resources to peacekeeping operations. Thirteen 
other member states and a number of IOs are present as observers (UN Peacekeeping 
2010) 
                                                
6
 According to two of my informants. 
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There are currently over 100 TCCs, each with differing national military doctrines, 
capabilities and “historical and cultural ties to the people” in the countries hosting 
peacekeeping operations (Ahmed et al. 2007: 26). UN peacekeeping operations have 
also grown in both size and ambitions. These factors have made it increasingly 
difficult for the Force Generation Service to muster the adequate number and quality 
of troops (Bellamy & Williams 2010). According to Bellamy and Williams (2010) the 
DPKO is also caught in a perpetual financial crisis, due to the member states’ 
unwillingness to sufficiently fund the planning, management and employment of 
peacekeeping operations.  
In this thesis I analyze how the DPKO Gender Unit works to promote the Women, 
Peace, and Security Resolutions in the work of military peacekeepers and what 
contextual issues and actors they see as constraining or helping them in their work. 
This is in order to explain the Department’s difficulties in implementing these 
Resolutions, despite the UN’s continued rhetorical support of this agenda. The critics 
of the implementation process introduced in this chapter, point to internal 
characteristics of the organization itself when explaining this discrepancy between 
rhetoric and practice. The outline of the formal structure of the DPKO shows that the 
member states are in charge of the Departments’ funding and have veto power over the 
its formal strategies. The member states also fund and supply troops and equipment for 
peacekeeping missions. Interacting and cooperating with the member states is 
therefore a regular feature in the work of many of the DPKO’s staff. This suggests that 
an analysis of organizational change in the DPKO without including how the 
organization and its staff try to influence and are influenced by the UN member states 
is incomplete. The theoretical perspectives introduced in the next chapter expand on 
this notion. 
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3. Understanding International Organizations  
As outlined in the introduction, the scholars and activists critical of the implementation 
process at the UN argue that internal features of the organization itself are the cause of 
its lack of progress. They describe a UN seemingly impervious to the demands of 
activists and UN personnel trying to mainstream the Women, Peace, and Security 
agenda in the organization’s formal structure and policy agenda. This explanation 
assumes that organizational change in the UN can be analyzed by treating the 
organization as independent from its context and outside actors. The purpose of this 
chapter is to examine whether theoretical perspectives on organizational change and 
discrepancies between rhetoric and practice in IOs can offer suggestions toward an 
alternative explanation as to why the implementation process is moving slowly.  
The critics featured in the former chapter argue that gender mainstreaming is 
particularly difficult to implement in organizational settings. I will not presuppose that 
this is the case, but rather return to this point in my empirical findings. Instead, I will 
make use of theoretical perspectives on change in IOs that often do not discuss gender 
questions explicitly in order to understand gender mainstreaming of the peacekeeping 
agenda at the UN.  
The aim of this chapter is to map out how theoretical perspectives and scholars 
analyzing organizational change and discrepancies between rhetoric and practice in 
IOs would explain the slow implementation of the Women, Peace, and Security 
Resolutions at the DPKO, despite the UN’s vocal support of this agenda. In order to do 
that, two underlying questions must be addressed. First, can the UN and its staff 
initiate and actualize change in the organization’s formal and informal priorities, 
practices and structure by itself, or are other actors influential in this process? 
Secondly, if the UN and its staff have the power to create organizational changes, what 
strategies do they employ to achieve this? I will try to address these two questions in 
turn, as explained through various theoretical perspectives in IR theory, some of which 
are heavily influenced by organizational sociology. I then return to the apparent 
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difference between rhetoric and practice when it comes to the Women, Peace, and 
Security agenda at the UN. 
 
3.1 Change in International Organizations   
The question of which actors and factors determine change in IOs has divided IR 
scholars for a long time and in this section I outline the central theoretical perspectives 
on this subject. It is important to note, however, that these theoretical perspectives do 
not represent unitary schools of thoughts; scholars identifying themselves with the 
different theoretical perspectives I outline might disagree over parts of the theoretical 
framework. For the sake of argument and clarity, I introduce some of the central 
features that are common within important IR theories, but this is not an in-depth 
analysis of these theories, and nuances and debates within and between each 
theoretical perspective will not be included.  
The question of whom and what helps determine organizational change in IOs is also 
debated on different analytical levels. The theories introduced in the first part of this 
chapter focus primarily on how states interact with or through IOs, or on the 
international system as such. They are consequently on an analytical level remote from 
the individual actors working in IOs. Other theories presented later in this chapter 
focus on the internal life of IOs themselves, and are thereby closer to my own 
analytical level, which focus on how a group of employees at the DPKO work to 
promote the Women, Peace, and Security agenda. The theories offer important 
contributions to this thesis, although in different ways. Firstly, because the theories 
examining the internal life of IOs are in some cases developed as a reaction to the 
more state-centric theories of IR. Second, all the theories do to some extent contribute 
to the debate over whom has the power to initiate and drive organizational change in 
IOs, and especially about how influential states are in this process.  
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3.1.1 Neorealism and Neo-liberalism 
Neorealism and neo-liberalism are efforts to explain the behavior of states and how 
they interact. The analytical starting point of neorealism is that the interaction of states 
creates structures, which places restrictions on their future actions (Waltz 2008). The 
central characteristic of this international structure is that it is anarchic, in that it is 
comprised of “independent states that have no central authority above them” 
(Mearsheimer 2001: 30). As such, states are the only relevant actors in this system. 
Neo-liberalists, on the other hand, hold that not just states, but “international regimes”, 
such as IOs, are of analytical interest. International regimes are defined as “sets of 
implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around 
which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations” 
(Krasner, as quoted in Keohane 1984: 57). They are important “not because they 
constitute centralized quasi-governments” (Keohane 1984: 244), but because they 
facilitate international cooperation. States initiate international regimes and 
cooperation if it is in their self-interest. However, cooperation is not synonymous with 
shared interests; it usually requires states to “adjust policies to meet the demands of 
others” (Keohane 1984: 12).  
Both these perspectives agree, however, that IOs do not have autonomy from, or 
power over, states. “Institutions that facilitate cooperation do not mandate what 
governments must do; rather, they pursue their own interests through cooperation” 
(Keohane 1984: 246). IOs are constructed, maintained and changed to benefit 
powerful states and consequently do not act independently. States use IOs to further 
their agendas and it is in their interest that IOs function to that end (Keohane1984, 
Waltz 1979, 2008). Changing IOs’ priorities, structures or practice without the consent 
and cooperation of states would thereby imply forcing states to act contrary to their 
own interests. Even if IOs had some degree of autonomy, this would be impossible, as 
IOs have little or no power independent from states (Mearsheimer 2001). States are 
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consequently the only actors who can initiate and accomplish organizational change in 
IOs (Waltz 1979, Mearsheimer 2001). Other neo-liberal scholars contest this point
7
.  
This conclusion is partly a result of how these perspectives understand power. 
According to Waltz (1979: 192) “an agent is powerful to the extent that he affects 
others more than they affect him”. The outcome of attempts to change your opponent’s 
behavior depends on the distribution of “capabilities” between you, but also on the 
strategic skill by which you make use of these capabilities, as well as the specific 
context at hand (2001: 191). Some neorealists, such as Mearsheimer (2001), place a lot 
of emphasis on military strength and maintains that the hierarchy of states in the 
international system can largely be distributed along these lines. Other neorealists, 
including Waltz (1979, 2008), agree with neo-liberalists that also economic, 
technological and political capabilities are important instruments of power (Kjær 
2004).  
Neorealists and most neo-liberalists rule out the possibility that IOs themselves may 
initiate or achieve organizational change on their own. For my analytical purposes, 
these perspectives’ emphasis on states’ influence serves as an important contrast to the 
analysis offered by the critics of the Women, Peace, and Security implementation at 
the UN presented in the chapter above, who focus mostly on internal features of the 
UN itself. The theories described in this section would argue that the reason for the 
UN’s lack of progress is that implementation is not in accordance with the interests of 
the powerful states controlling the UN. What is lacking from these theoretical 
perspectives is an inquiry into how states’ interests are formed. Moreover, it is 
assumed that IOs and their staff automatically act in accordance with state instructions. 
This is not taken for granted by the constructivist perspective.   
 
                                                
7
 Rosenau is one example of a neo-realist scholar who argues that states are not the only actors with authority in 
the international system. He holds that there are a variety of IOs, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
other international networks capable of influencing global norms and practices by placing them on the 
international agenda (Kjær 2004).  
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3.1.2 Constructivism 
Constructivist perspectives on how states and IOs interact, also examine how states’ 
and other interests are constructed. Their epistemological foundation and 
understanding of power separates this perspective further for the theories introduced 
above. While constructivism, like the other theoretical perspectives presented in this 
chapter, is not a homogeneous set of ideas, constructivists share the epistemological 
position that our cultural background, historical context and social relationships 
determine how we understand the world. These “intersubjective processes” (Joachim 
2003: 249) shape our worldview and are the basis of our interests and actions. States’ 
and other actors’ interests and actions may consequently be influenced by others and 
change depending on context. As a consequence, constructivists answer my question 
of who determines change in IOs quite differently from the previous perspectives.  
Barnett and Finnemore’s (2004) have made one of the central contributions to 
constructivist analysis of IOs’ relationship to states. They argue that while states 
greatly influence IOs’ behavior, internal features of IOs themselves are also decisive. 
IOs not only have a large degree of autonomy, they also have the power to influence 
states. There are two main reasons for their opposing conclusions. Firstly, they have 
moved the analytical focus. The theoretical perspectives presented above are mostly 
concerned with the international system as such or why states create IOs, and take for 
granted that IOs will continue to function as they were designed (Barnett & Finnemore 
2004). Barnett and Finnemore instead “put […] the interactive relationship between 
states and IOs at the center of analysis” (Barnett & Finnemore 2004: 12.). In so doing, 
they necessarily understand IOs as social actors and understanding their internal 
features and staff becomes significant to the analysis of this relationship. 
Secondly, the constructivist understanding of power is markedly different from that 
held by the opposing perspectives. Rather than being something that a state or an actor 
has over others, this perspective understands power as a complex social relationship, 
where individual outcomes are dependent on the context at hand. Barnett and 
Finnemore (2004: 29) define power as “production, in and through social relations, of 
effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their own circumstances and 
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fate”, which is translated throughout their book into “the capacity to get others to 
defer” (Barnett & Finnemore 2004). Because power is understood as socially 
constructed, this perspective opens up for new potential sources of power, which 
cannot be expected to be effective in every situation and relationship. The sociologist 
Max Weber termed power that is perceived as legitimate by those who are governed as 
“authority”. Barnett and Finnemore combine this idea of legitimacy with constructivist 
ideas when they define authority as “the ability of one actor to use institutional and 
discursive resources to induce deference from others” (Barnett & Finnemore 2004: 5). 
This often implies “telling people what is the right thing to do” (Barnett & Finnemore 
2004: 20), either directly or by changing states’ preferences by shaping the boundaries 
for what states and the world around them sees as legitimate action. Because power is 
understood as a relationship where both sides have agency, “compliance is not 
automatic” (Barnett & Finnemore 2004: 20). States and others may refuse if deference 
is against their expressed interests or if other sources of authority give contradicting 
judgments. Authority is consequently not “fixed, singular, or always obeyed” (Barnett 
& Finnemore 2004: 20). I will return to how IOs employ their institutional and 
discursive sources of power in the next section of this chapter, but I will first elaborate 
on why IOs might be seen as legitimately telling other actors, including states, how 
they should act or understand certain issues. 
According to Barnett & Finnemore (2004), IOs have authority because they are 
designed as bureaucracies. Building on the work of Weber, they argue that 
bureaucracies are vested with four interlinked forms of authority. The first is rational-
legal authority. Bureaucracies are considered a rational and effective way of solving 
important societal tasks. Their actions and decisions are also legitimized through the 
impersonal rules and procedures through which they are made. The neutral application 
of rules ensures that bureaucracies are committed to solving their given tasks. Barnett 
& Finnemore (2004) stress that neutrality is clearly impossible, but the perception of it 
provides bureaucracies’ instructions and actions with legitimacy and thereby authority.  
Being responsible for resolving important societal problems and defending “the values 
of the international community” (Barnett & Finnemore 2004: 23) provides IOs with 
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moral authority, as long as they are considered to be dedicated to the common good, 
compared to the “narrow self-interest” guiding the actions of states and other 
stakeholders. This depoliticizes the work of IOs, something that is reinforced by their 
third source of authority. Because IOs are created to ensure that people with highly 
specialist knowledge manage important social tasks, their provisions carry expert 
authority. Their knowledge is seen as “objective” and is thereby perceived to be of 
higher value than the politically tainted opinions of other stakeholders. Fourthly and 
importantly, is the delegated authority from states. As IOs are often charged with tasks 
states for some reason are unable to carry out or have limited knowledge of, they are 
often mandated considerable autonomy as long as they appear to serve states’ interests.  
Barnett and Finnemore (2004) stress that IOs do not only use their authority to get 
other actors to defer. IOs often work together with states and other international actors 
such as NGOs to achieve their goals, although they do not explore how and why IOs 
do this.  
Another important point for Barnett & Finnemore (2004) is that IOs’ bureaucratic 
nature has implications not only for their relationship with the outside world, but also 
for the inner dynamic of the organizations. Drawing on sociological-institutionalist 
theory, they argue that IOs as bureaucratic organizations develop strong and distinct 
organizational cultures that advise and sustain their behavior. While the organization’s 
environment influences this culture, it is also a result of its rules and procedures, as 
well as the specific division of labor organizing its work. Organizational culture 
“shapes bureaucrats’ view of the world, define their social tasks, shape their interests, 
and orient them in similar ways toward the world” (Barnett & Finnemore 2004: 19). It 
guides what its bureaucrats deem to be appropriate action, “but does not determine it” 
(Barnett & Finnemore 2004: 19). While organizational culture influence bureaucrats’ 
actions, it is also shaped by these very actions (Barnett & Finnemore 2004). By 
stressing this, the authors probably wish to distance themselves from the constructivist 
scholars focusing more exclusively on how culture socializes actors, often neglecting 
their agency. However, Barnett and Finnemore’s (2004) case studies, including an 
analysis of the UN’s failure to intervene in the Rwandan genocide, hardly reflect this. 
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Here, organizational culture seems to be almost dictating the staff’s actions, leading to 
disastrous results. That Barnett and Finnemore (2004) deprive IO bureaucrats of their 
agency is also a main strand of criticism against their analysis (Seabrook & Tsingou 
2009).  
Barnett and Finnemore (2004) maintain that internal features of an IO and the agency 
of its staff are important when analyzing organizational change in IOs. As elaborated 
on above, Barnett & Finnemore (2004) conflate the agency and interests of IOs and its 
staff, and it is often unclear whom they consider the actual social agents. Usually, IOs 
are presented as unitary actors who have interests and power vis-à-vis states. I will 
return to this point later in the chapter. The most important contribution of this 
perspective is its counterargument to the neo-realists/neo-liberalists understanding of 
IOs as completely dictated by outside forces. Outside demands or constraints, either by 
states or from changes in the wider normative context of the IO, may be a crucial 
factor, but these attempts will be filtered through the existing culture, which will affect 
the outcome of the reform process. Change can also emerge from processes within the 
organization, such as internal conflicts over resources or negotiation and 
reinterpretation of the existing culture (Barnett & Finnemore 2004). In the following 
section, I will elaborate on how IO staff act in order to achieve their agendas, such as 
organizational change. Here also the constructivist perspective has made important 
contributions. 
 
3.2 What strategies may IOs employ to achieve organizational change?  
The constructivist perspective on IOs opens up for the possibility that organizations 
themselves can initiate and determine organizational change. Since member states are 
such powerful stakeholder in IOs, this would imply that IOs have influence in their 
relationship vis-à-vis states. Barnett & Finnemore (2004) stress that this does not mean 
that IOs are able to force powerful states to behave in accordance with IOs’ 
instructions. Rather, the power of IOs is determined by their ability to help create 
social reality and thereby direct the interests and actions of states and other 
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stakeholders. In this section I elaborate on how IOs try to influence states and other 
stakeholders to achieve organizational change or other agendas. 
 
3.2.1 Framing 
According to the constructivist perspective, IOs influence how other actors perceive 
the world by defining meaning and classifying the world around us. The way we 
ascribe meaning to events and the world around us is not objective or fixed. Rather, 
they are “made meaningful by actors, and actors compete to affix meaning to these 
events because doing so creates boundaries for acceptable action” (Barnett & 
Finnemore 2004: 33). This effort to make others share your understanding of an event 
or problem is referred to as framing, and shared frames may form the basis of common 
norms and social mobilization (Barnett & Finnemore 2004). Accordingly, if an IO 
wants to change their organizational structure and priorities in order to accommodate a 
new issue or problem, framing can be employed in an effort to ensure that member 
states and other important stakeholders share the IOs perception of this new issue or 
problem. It would also have to promote the IO as the best possible custodian or 
solution, as well a blueprint of how the IO must change to accommodate this new 
demand. While it depends on the context, states and other stakeholders often defer to 
the frames promoted by IOs because of IOs’ rational-legal, moral, expert or delegated 
authority.  
An example of successful framing is how the area of human rights has grown to its 
current prominence. “IOs have helped determine not only who is in violation of human 
rights but also what human rights are and what should be done to promote or protect 
them” (Barnett & Finnemore 2004: 7). Human rights are also an example of how IOs 
influence how states behave. The articulation and diffusion of norms through framing 
creates boundaries for what is perceived as legitimate behavior, so while not all states 
uphold the human rights of its citizens, they are widely accepted international norms 
and violators can expect condemnation and sometimes even punitive measures from 
both national and international NGOs, IOs and other states. Achieving a similar status 
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is the goal of the advocates of the Women, Peace, and Security agenda inside and 
outside the UN. 
 
Elsewhere, Finnemore and Sikkink elaborate on how actors use framing to help 
establish norms, defined as “a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given 
identity” (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998: 891), and work strategically to make these 
norms influential internationally. They describe a three-step process of how norms are 
made influential. In the first stage, norms emerge, often through the efforts of devoted 
activists, or “norm entrepreneurs”, to convert other actors nationally and 
internationally, and especially influential “norm leaders” to take on their cause. These 
“norm leaders” can for instance be countries with particularly high moral standing or 
countries that are influential in the field they are trying to influence. In order to reach a 
wider audience advocates need an organizational platform from which to promote their 
cause. This organizational platform can take the form of an issue oriented NGO or an 
IO with a multitude of tasks.  
The second stage of this process happens if a sufficient number of states have adopted 
a norm. It then reaches a “tipping point”, after which the norm “cascades”, making it 
generally recognized among states and other stakeholders. Endorsement is at this point 
often an effort to conform to pressure from other states, as much as a result of the 
advocacy of “norm entrepreneurs” and domestic audiences. Empirical studies suggest 
at least one-third of the total number of states must adopt a norm for a tipping point to 
occur. However, this varies as it also depends on factors such as the inherent 
characteristics of the norm itself, such as its clarity and distinctness, how influential 
early supporters are, and the historical and cultural context in which the norm emerges. 
These factors also influence whether or not a tipping point is reached. Finnemore and 
Sikkink (1998: 901) also acknowledge that the question of why a tipping point occurs 
remains unexplored. However, if a norm cascades it might enter a the third stage of 
this process, when “norm internalization occurs [and] norms acquire a taken-for-
granted quality…” (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998: 895).  
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Understanding why framing attempts succeed or fail is also one of the central points of 
Joachim’s (2003) work. Unlike Barnett and Finnemore (2004) and Finnemore and 
Sikkink (1998) she also elaborates on how framing attempts can be both aided and 
thwarted by other states, organizations or individuals. 
 
3.2.2 Creating Alliances 
Joachim (2003) describes how NGOs use framing to influence the UN and its member 
states, illustrated by how international women’s organizations managed to place 
domestic violence and reproductive rights on the UN agenda during the early 1990s
8
. 
Both were issues characterized by “little preexisting consensus among states as to what 
constitutes violence and whether or how much control a woman should have over her 
reproduction” (Joachim 2003: 248). Moreover, many member states regarded them to 
be national matters in which the UN should not interfere.  
Joachim (2003) explains the eventual success of the NGO community by using the 
framing concept introduced above, which she argues provides a bridge between the 
rational, strategic actors portrayed by neorealists/neo-liberalists and the 
constructivists’ attention to how interests are constructed and changed through social 
processes. Like Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), Joachim shows how NGOs use 
framing strategically in order to shape how international policy issues are perceived 
and acted upon by other actors. Framing thereby “provides external resources for 
relatively weak actors to pursue normative change at the international level” (Joachim 
2003: 251). She moreover emphasizes how context, such as other actors and events, 
imposes obstacles and provides opportunities for framing attempts, which she refers to 
as a political opportunity structure (Joachim 2003). Barnett and Finnemore (2004) 
argue that other actors often defer to IOs framing of issues because they have 
authority. Joachim (2003), on the other hand, holds that frames are seldom constructed 
                                                
8
 As I outlined in the background chapter of this thesis, these achievements formed the foundation for similar 
efforts for the Women, Peace and Security agenda later on. 
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or changed through the efforts of a single actor or institution. Rather, NGOs often 
cooperate with influential allies, such as IOs, states or the media. The political 
opportunity structure provides NGOs with potential allies and opportunities for 
framing, including world events, access to other influential actors, changes in political 
alignments and conflicts. World events may induce influential actors to see problems 
differently or search for alternative solutions, creating space for NGOs advocating 
their agenda. Changes in political alignments may bring new actors into power that are 
more or less benevolent towards the NGOs’ agenda. Conflicts between influential 
actors on relevant subjects may give NGOs a chance to act as mediator and at the same 
time advocate their own frames. However, changes in the political opportunity 
structure might also be for the worse and without access to these potential partners, 
framing opportunities and alliances are lost. Alliances and opportunities are in 
themselves not sufficient to frame issues. The skills and capacities of the organizations 
are equally important for successful outcomes.  
Two of Joachim’s (2003) points are directly relevant for my own analysis. She 
demonstrates how framing efforts can be both restrained and assisted by other actors 
and circumstances. The analysis also establishes how NGOs, and not just states, can 
pressure the UN to adopt new priorities. For IOs such as the UN, this may become a 
problem. They often face conflicting demands, or demands that collide with the 
actions determined appropriate by internal organizational culture. The result is often a 
startling discrepancy between IOs’ rhetoric and action. 
  
3.3 Discrepancies Between Rhetoric and Practice in IOs  
As stated earlier, the purpose of this chapter is to identify how different theoretical 
perspectives analyzing organizational change and discrepancies between rhetoric and 
practice in IOs can help us understand the UN’s slow implementation of the Women, 
Peace, and Security Resolutions, despite its vocal support of the agenda. Before 
considering how the theories outlined in this chapter are relevant for the Women, 
Peace, and Security implementation process at the DPKO, I wi
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explanations to why there is a discrepancy between an IO’s rhetorical goals and 
commitments and what it actually does in practice.  
 
3.3.1 “Organized Hypocrisy” 
This discrepancy, theoretically referred to as organized hypocrisy, is the focus of the 
work of both Michael Lipson (2007a) and Catherine Weaver (2008). Like Joachim 
(2003) these scholars try to incorporate ideas from both sides of the debate between 
constructivism and neo-realism/neo-liberalism, while also drawing on sociological 
theory.  
The term organized hypocrisy was originally a contribution to organizational 
sociology by Nils Brunsson, which Weaver (2008) and Lipson (2007a) relocated from 
the domestic to the international arena. According to Brunsson (2002), organizations 
depend on the outside world for material resources, such as funding and its work force. 
The environment also provides organizations with legitimacy, contingent on how they 
manage to reflect the environment’s culture, norms or other demands, or how 
effectively they carry out their given tasks. The organization’s environment is not 
unitary; there are often a variety of outside actors and agendas creating “conflicting 
material and normative pressures” (Lipson 2007a: 6) for the organization. Hypocrisy, 
defined as “inconsistent rhetoric and action” (Lipson 2007a: 8), makes it possible for 
an organization to maintain its legitimacy in this difficult situation. Brunsson 
distinguishes between two types, the organization of hypocrisy and organized 
hypocrisy, neither being necessarily the conscious strategy of an organization’s staff. 
The organization of hypocrisy refers to how these constraints and demands are 
“incorporated into organizations’ internal structures” (Lipson 2007a: 9). Organized 
hypocrisy refers to inconsistencies in organizational output, separated into talk, 
decisions or actions. In other words, when rhetoric or decisions do not lead to 
corresponding action. Rather, talk and decisions are substitutes for action, so that the 
organization can be seen as placating conflicting normative and material demands at 
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the same time. This is exactly what the UN has been criticized for doing with regards 
the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions. 
Brunsson (2002) continues by distinguishing between two organizational ideal types 
that solve this problem in very different ways. An “action-oriented” organization is a 
coherent, independent unit focused on solving an important problem or changing its 
environment (ibid: 194). They are considered as legitimate by the outside world if they 
effectively solve their task. The NGOs analyzed by Joachim (2003), trying to push 
women’s issues on to the UN’s agenda, are examples of organizations close to this 
ideal type. A “political” organization, on the other hand, is “organizational actors with 
porous boundaries, interpenetrated and constituted by their institutional environments” 
(Lipson 2007a: 10-11). They often have much wider mandates and are charged with 
important, but often insoluble problems. Their legitimacy does not stem from effective 
action, but from their ability to mirror the inconsistent culture and norms of the 
environment. “Action oriented” and “political” organizations are ideal types; real life 
organizations can be found anywhere in between and most often face demands for 
action and that they reflect outside norms to a varying degree (Brunsson 2002).  
Both types of organizations employ both types of hypocrisy. Hypocrisy is reflected in 
the internal structures of “action oriented organizations” when outside norms and 
demands are incompatible with “efficiently generating coordinated action” (Brunsson 
2002: 7). This is solved by having two organizational structures exist side by side: one 
formal structure fashioned to generate talk and decisions in accordance to the demands 
and norms of the outside world, and an informal structure “used in reality” (Brunsson 
2002: 7) which is responsible for action. For “political” organizations, wide mandates 
may lead to complex organizational structures with a variety of divisions and sub-
divisions, each serving different masters and promoting its own agenda (Brunsson 
2002, Weaver 2008).  
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3.3.2 The UN as a “Political Organization” 
Organized hypocrisy, or when an organization’s talk and decisions are inconsistent 
with or contrary to action, is the focus of Lipson’s (2007a) work, and he uses 
Brunsson’s term in an effort to explain why many UN peacekeeping operations fail to 
accomplish their mandates. He first identifies the UN as an international “political” 
organization, an “open system”, “constituted and penetrated by the member states” 
(2007a: 12). Its legitimacy is not only dependent on its ability to reflect its members’ 
various preferences and commonly held norms, it is also expected to actually 
accomplish extremely difficult tasks such as peacekeeping. In other words, it face both 
“political” and “action-oriented” expectation and demands. The problem is that 
material constraints or normative pressure from the member states often contradicts 
the goals that the UN is meant to achieve. One example is when norms widely held by 
the member states, such as sovereignty, conflicts with tasks the organization is charged 
with, such as the protection of civilians. Another is when the UN is pressured to send 
peacekeeping forces in the face of a political or humanitarian crisis, without being 
supplied the resources, funding or political will necessary to effectively accomplish the 
task. The result is that the UN addresses many of these issues solely through 
“discussion, debate, and by issuing declarations, Resolutions and other forms of 
organizational talk and decisions” (Lipson 2007a: 13). Like Brunsson (2002), Lipson 
(2007a) does not necessarily consider organized hypocrisy to be normatively wrong. 
While it might cause mission failure or undermine efforts to solve important global 
issues, organized hypocrisy may also be a strategy to manage an otherwise impossible 
situation and create space for effective action.  
Concerning whether state interests or internal features of IOs themselves determine IO 
behavior and organizational change and whether IOs can influence state behavior, 
Lipson elsewhere argues that both organizational culture and member state pressure 
determines how the UN acts (Lipson 2007b). The theoretical outline of his article on 
hypocrisy in the UN (Lipson 2007a) stresses that IOs are “not unitary actors but rather, 
collectives constituted and endowed with social agency by their social environment” 
(Lipson 2007a: 9). While stressing the lack of boundaries between the UN and its 
35 
 
member states, Lipson (2007a) focus mainly on organized hypocrisy and not on how 
the internal structure of the organization incorporates the conflicting pressure in his 
analysis of UN peacekeeping. The result is that the differences between various parts 
of the UN when it comes to agendas and relationships with member states and other 
important actors remain unexplored. When applying the theory in his analysis of UN 
peacekeeping, he treats the UN as a unitary actor with a single agenda, which is 
maintaining its legitimacy in the eyes of its surroundings by placating the goals and 
demands formulated by the member states and other stakeholders, leaving little room 
for the interests and agency of UN staff.  
 
3.3.3 IO Staff as the Social Agents 
This is not the case with Weaver’s (2008) analysis of hypocrisy in the World Bank, 
where she portrays IOs as a myriad of “independent and uncoordinated individuals or 
departments each being an actor on its own…” (Brunsson as quoted in Weaver 2008: 
34). Outside demands may have shaped the formal structure of the organization, but 
these demands do not decide the behavior of the organization’s staff. They have 
agency and interests in their own right and organizational culture is only one of the 
factors shaping their interests. Weaver thereby changes the analytical focus closer to 
the individual employees of the organization, and it is they, not the organization itself, 
who are considered social agents.  
Like Lipson (2007a), Weaver’s (2004) primary focus is on organized hypocrisy. In 
addition to Brunsson (2002), her analysis also incorporates other scholars from 
organizational sociology, who focus on organizations’ internal culture, as well as 
Barnett and Finnemore (2004). Based on her extensive fieldwork in the World Bank, 
she demonstrates how pressure for reform from within and without the Bank led to 
discrepancies between the organization’s talk, decisions and action. The World Bank 
initially disregarded increasingly fashionable concepts in the development sector, such 
as good governance and anti-corruption, even though these concepts were understood 
as “morally indisputable” (Weaver 2008: 92) by many of the powerful member states 
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and other stakeholders. The disregard was a result of the new ideas’ difficulty in fitting 
in with the organization’s “economistic and technocratic culture” (Weaver 2008: 39), 
but also because of the heavy-handedness of some of the reformers. The result was 
organized hypocrisy. The lesson Weaver draws from this is that organizational change 
depends “not only on navigating the dangerous political waters around the Bank, but 
also the cultural waters of its bureaucracy” (Weaver 2008: 139). However, she stresses 
that organizational culture is not static or all encompassing for the staff’s behavior. 
Organization’s ideologies, norms, language and routines are constantly being 
negotiated, contested and revised, either by outside pressure, such as from member 
states, civil society or other stakeholders, or by organization staff themselves bringing 
their personal experiences and knowledge with them in their work. Organizational 
culture is therefore a central arena for organizational change. By employing a 
constructivist understanding of power the staff are not only agents, they may 
potentially influence both the organization’s and its member states’ behavior. 
With regards to the theoretical perspectives introduced above she warns about 
perceiving either internal or external culture and demands as static or unitary. She also 
stresses the danger of portraying the actions of IO staff as determined by either states’ 
demands or organization culture. Rather, she finds ample evidence of strategic agency 
among staff pursuing their different agendas. 
 
3.4 Relevance for the Implementation Process at the DPKO  
As stated in the introduction, this thesis’ primary research questions are: What 
strategies did the team responsible for coordinating the implementation of the Women, 
Peace and Security Resolutions at the DPKO employ in their effort to implement this 
agenda in the work of military peacekeepers? And what contextual issues and actors 
did they see as constraining or aiding them in their effort?  
The aim of these questions is to understand the DPKO’s lack of progress in 
implementing the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions, despite the UN’s 
rhetorical commitment to this agenda. The critical literature introduced in the former 
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chapter argues that this is a consequence of a lack of normative consensus, prejudice 
when it comes to gender issues and organizational inertia in the UN itself. The primary 
purpose of this chapter was to examine whether theoretical perspectives on 
organizational change and differences between rhetoric and practice in IOs could 
contribute to an alternative explanation. As indicated above, these theoretical 
perspectives offer diverging explanations to this inconsistency. They would all agree, 
however, that the UN member states play an important part. 
The theoretical perspectives introduced in this chapter suggest a more complicated 
picture than that presented by the critics. The neo-realist and neo-liberalist 
perspectives suggest that the process of implementing the Women, Peace, and Security 
agenda in the UN cannot be analyzed without considering how the UN member states 
influence this process. However, these perspectives do not offer any suggestions as to 
how the relationship between the UN and member states play out for the staff working 
in the DPKO or the rest of the UN organization. Lipson’s (2007a) analysis of the UN 
offers some answers. He holds that the member states are integrated into the UN’s 
formal structure and that being perceived by the member states as embodying their 
values and conforming to their demands is the source of the UN’s funding and 
legitimacy. As I described in my outline of the organizational structure of the DPKO, 
the member states are formally in charge of both the Department’s budgets and 
priorities. Following Lipson (2007a), the discrepancies between the DPKO’s rhetoric 
and actions, which the critical literature of the organization’s implementation process 
sets out to expose, are a consequence of incompatible demands from the member 
states. Placating the demands for gender mainstreaming through rhetorical 
commitment to the Resolutions without actual implementation would solve this 
problem. While Lipson holds that the UN also has an organizational culture, it is 
unclear what this implies. It also remains unclear whether the UN has any influence in 
its relationship with the member states, or if it is only aiming to accommodate the 
different values and demands of the member states as best it can.  
Barnett and Finnemore’s (2004) work suggest that the UN has authority, which makes 
it capable of influencing how member states perceive and thereby acts when it comes 
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to implementing the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions. They also argue that 
implementation of the Resolutions in the organization itself should be carried out by 
the organization itself and not just as a result of outside demands. I find Barnett and 
Finnemore’s (2004) constructivist understanding of power useful for my analytical 
purpose because it understands power as a relationship where all sides have agency. It 
also accommodates the notion that how this relationship plays out is dependent on 
context. Their understanding does not mean that material resources are not important 
sources of power. However, the institutional and discursive power of the UN and other 
actors help determine when, where and how other sources of power are used and 
perceived as legitimate.  
Suggestions of how this power may be exercised can also be found in Barnett and 
Finnemore’s (2004) discussion of authority and framing. Their understanding of 
framing is of particular interest to my analysis of how members of the DPKO work to 
mainstream the Women, Peace, and Security agenda in their own organization and 
among military peacekeepers.  
Barnett and Finnemore (2004) characterize the relationship between the UN and its 
member states as cooperation and competition for influence over central issues without 
exploring how and when competition and cooperation takes place. These questions 
are, on the other hand, addressed by Joachim (2003). Accordingly, the DPKO team’s 
framing efforts of the Women, Peace, and Security agenda can be both aided and 
restricted by other actors, such as international or national NGOs or member states. 
Moreover, both member states and NGOs are often employing the same tactics and 
might thereby influence the UN’s political agenda and actions. She stresses, however, 
that successful framing and alliance building may depend on structural factors and 
events outside the UN’s control. Joachim’s (2003) work also suggests that other actors, 
such as NGOs, may pressure and influence the UN political agenda and actions when 
it comes to the Women, Peace, and Security agenda.  
Weaver’s (2008) work on organized hypocrisy highlights additional problems with 
both Lipson’s (2007a) and Barnett and Finnemore’s (2004) analyses with regards to 
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my research question. They portray the UN as a unitary structure, where the behavior 
of UN staff is largely determined either by the demands of the member states or by 
organizational culture. In these theories there is little room for the agency of the 
organization’s staff, which is the central focus of this thesis. Weaver (2008) 
demonstrates that IOs, such as the UN, are neither unitary nor static. Accordingly, the 
agenda of the DPKO and its staff is influenced by the UN’s common culture, but also 
by the units’ specific relationship with the world around the Department, including the 
larger UN organization, the member states, NGOs and other actors. Weaver’s (2008) 
work also explains how the relationship between the staff, the DPKO’s organizational 
culture and its environment is interactive, giving the staff not only agency, but also 
potential power. Organizational culture and the relationship with outside actors 
consequently provide both instruments of power and constraints for individuals or 
groups of staff. How much the actions of the DPKO staff is constrained is however 
uncertain. As a theoretical research question guiding my thesis I therefore ask: In 
which ways are the actions of DPKO staff influenced by the interests of member states 
and to what extent are they independent social actors? 
In sum, the different theoretical perspectives provide supplementary insights, which 
helped me in both collecting and analyzing the empirical data that informs the 
conclusions of this thesis. Lipson (2007a) and Weaver (2008) provide elaborate 
descriptions of the complex institutional structure the DPKO team works in and how 
this formal and cultural structure provides boundaries for their actions. This structure 
is not static and can consequently be changed. Barnett and Finnemore (2004), Joachim 
(2003) and Weaver (2008) suggest tools IO staff may employ in their efforts to bring 
about change by influencing the rest of the organization and member states. The 
theoretical perspectives’ differing views on the agency and authority of UN staff have 
also provided me with a theoretical research question, which I will answer after 
presenting my research design and empirical findings. 
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4. Research Design 
In order to understand what strategies the team responsible for coordinating the 
implementation of the Women, Peace and Security Resolutions at the DPKO 
employed in their effort to implement this agenda in the work of military peacekeepers 
and how contextual issues and other actors constrained or aided their efforts, I relied 
on a combination of interviews and text analysis, which I elaborate on below. But first 
I will outline the epistemological foundation for this thesis and how to ensure the 
quality of research. 
 
4.1 Scientific Rigor and Epistemology 
The epistemological perspective presented by Wetherell, Taylor & Yates (2001) and 
Kvale (2001) forms the basis of this thesis. These scholars propose a view of truth as 
something situated, conditional and reflexive. Establishing scientific rigor is 
consequently dependent on the researcher’s ability to argue convincingly that the 
findings presented are more accurate than competing interpretations and is a question 
of communicating methodological proficiency to a critical reader. Central to achieving 
this is presenting supported arguments for your interpretation and being critical toward 
your own conclusions. Scholarly work must be relevant for your scientific field and 
the world at large, as well as transparent with regards to your methodological and 
analytical choices. This includes openness around inconsistencies and diversity in your 
data. Consistent data from multiple types of sources and methodologies will further 
increase the persuasive power of your conclusions. I will return to these common 
recommendations implicitly or explicitly throughout the relevant chapters of this 
thesis.  
The aim of this thesis is to understand my interviewees’ particular perspective on a 
specific process and not aiming at discovering some external objective truth. I am in 
other words interpreting my informants’ perception of the process (Fangen 2010). This 
means that the interviewees’ specific background and perspectives shape their 
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answers. My interpretations and analysis of these answers are furthermore based on 
my own frame of reference. To counter explicit misunderstandings I made an effort to 
check my interpretations by asking the informants directly if I had understood them 
correctly, either during the interview or through quote check, conversations or 
correspondence later in the process. However, for practical reasons this was not 
possible with some of the interviewees, mostly due to their busy schedules. My own 
background doubtlessly also influenced the answers I got. While I know a lot about the 
more general efforts and controversies of the implementation of the Women, Peace 
and Security Resolutions, I knew less than my expert informants of the particulars of 
the work done at the DPKO and their relationship with other important stakeholders. A 
more knowledgeable and experienced researcher might have been able to excavate 
more substantial findings. Moreover, someone less favorable to the goals of the 
Women, Peace and Security Resolutions might have prodded more critically during 
the interviews, which no doubt would have affected the findings. However, my 
relative inexperience often led the informants to explain their views very thoroughly, 
which often provided me with very clear formulations. By being perceived as 
benevolent to the Women, Peace, and Security agenda and not belonging to a 
particular organization with vested interests, the informants may also have expressed 
themselves more freely as they did not have to protect their agenda or fellow 
implementers in the UN or member states from criticism.  
 
4.2 Choice of Methodology and Sample 
I relied on three sources of data. My primary source was interviews with current and 
former staff employed at the DPKO to work with issues relating to the Women, Peace, 
and Security agenda. My second source was interviews with Norwegian diplomats, 
bureaucrats and scholars. Thirdly, I conducted textual analysis of the DPKO/DFS 
Gender Guidelines, which operationalizes the Women, Peace, and Security 
Resolutions for UN military personnel. Below, I will go into more detail about the two 
types of interviews, before elaborating on the text analysis.  
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The primary goal of this thesis is to understand the process of implementing the 
Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions at the DPKO from the perspective of those 
working to implement them. This could only be understood through interviews with 
the people in question (Rubin & Rubin 2005). I therefore chose qualitative interviews 
with personnel from the DPKO Gender Unit and the Office of Military Affairs 
involved in the process. I conducted seven interviews in total with former and current 
DPKO staff, which constitute my primary source of data for the analysis. As I will 
return to later in this chapter, the number of interviewees from the DPKO was decided 
by the limited number of people working with these subjects at the DPKO. 
As a secondary source of data, I conducted interviews with eight Norwegian scholars, 
bureaucrats and diplomats. The number of interviewees in this group was decided 
more randomly; I stopped seeking out additional informants when the interviews no 
longer generated new insights. The interviewees were chosen because they are experts 
either on the work of DPKO or on the implementation of the Women, Peace and 
Security Resolutions at the UN. The choice of Norwegians was both a matter of where 
I had most contacts and consequently access to interviewees, and due to Norway’s 
central position as a donor and its high level of political commitment to the Women, 
Peace and Security efforts at the UN
9
,  
The secondary interviews were conducted in two rounds. The first provided 
background information about the DPKO and other central stakeholders in the 
implementation process, which I made use of in preparing for my primary interviews 
with the DPKO personnel. The second round came after I returned from New York. In 
these interviews, I made use of the Norwegian informants’ expertise to discuss and 
validate the interpretations and conclusions I developed from the interviews with the 
DPKO personnel. These informants were invaluable in helping me in my efforts to 
interpret the answers given by the DPKO personnel by providing insight into the 
specific UN lingo, as well as the political context and controversies surrounding the 
implementation process.  
                                                
9
 This was brought up by every interviewee I interviewed and referred to as common knowledge. 
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The interviews with DPKO personnel and the Norwegian diplomats were conducted 
during my research trip to New York in the last days of February and early March 
2010 or over the telephone. 
DATA COLLECTION 
Mode Source 
Primary interviews DPKO personnel (5) Former DPKO personnel (2) 
Secondary interviews 
Norwegian 
bureaucrats (3) 
Norwegian 
diplomats (3) 
Norwegian scholars 
(2) 
Analysis of written 
material 
DPKO/DFS Gender Guidelines (2010) 
Table 4.1: Sources of Data 
 
4.2.1 Interview Format 
The interview guide I brought with me consisted of a short list of common topics I 
whished to discuss during the interviews, complimented by three or four questions 
specifically tailored to the informant at hand. This format was used for both primary 
and secondary interviews. My reason for choosing such an unstructured format was 
twofold. Firstly, as my initial interviews were exploratory, I did not wish to forfeit 
interesting subjects brought up by the informants, which I often added to my list of 
topics for subsequent interviews. Secondly, due to my informants’ busy schedules, the 
duration of the interviews varied greatly and I needed to find a format that could 
capture a similar range of subjects in very different time spans.  
The list of topics discussed during the interview included the criticism against the 
implementation process at the UN, possible obstacles to implementation, the 
relationship between the DPKO and other central stakeholders and the process of 
creating the gender guidelines. For the full list of topics, please see Appendix II of this 
thesis. The topics grew out of the literature critical of the implementation process at 
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the UN and from the theoretical perspectives that try to explain barriers to change in 
international organizations, as well as from the initial background interviews. How 
these subjects were approached varied from informant to informant, depending on 
whether the interviewee was one of the DPKO personnel or saw their work from the 
outside.  
 
4.2.2 Gaining Access to the Informants 
Coming in contact with potential participants among Norwegian diplomats, 
bureaucrats and scholars was fairly easy, as there are many people with extensive 
knowledge of this agenda at the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Permanent 
Mission of Norway to the UN and the Norwegian Police. I gained access to this group 
of informants by referral from other informants (snowball sampling), as well as 
through contacts among the researchers at PRIO (International Peace Research 
Institute, Oslo) and NUPI (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs), some of 
whom also served as informants. I tried to interview people who had different 
perspectives and areas of expertise, such as experts on the DPKO as an organization, 
the Women, Peace and Security agenda or people with substantial field experience 
from UN peacekeeping missions.  
Arranging interviews with DPKO personnel was more demanding. The Gender Unit 
consists of seven employees, including senior staff. In addition, three employees from 
the OMA were involved in the development of the gender guidelines. The number of 
potential interviewees drops further when taking into account busy work schedules and 
frequent traveling. I tried to solve this by also interviewing two former employees of 
the DPKO Gender Team. These participants often provided even richer data, as they 
could speak their mind more freely about controversial issues. I made contact with all 
the participants in this group through my own contacts at NUPI or with the help of my 
Norwegian informants.   
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4.2.3 Analyzing the Military Gender Guidelines 
The third source of information that contributed to the answer to my research 
questions was a textual analysis of the final draft of the DPKO/DFS Gender 
Guidelines. The guidelines are the first effort to operationalize UNSCR 1325, UNSCR 
1820, UNCR 1888 and UNSCR 1889 on Women, Peace and Security for military 
peacekeepers. The guidelines are meant to be practical tools in the planning and 
execution of peacekeeping missions by all military personnel, from the OMA at the 
UN headquarters in New York, to the operational-level at the force headquarters in the 
field and among deployed military personnel.  
I analyzed the gender guidelines after conducting my primary interviews with DPKO 
employees and the first round of background interviews with Norwegian bureaucrats, 
diplomats and scholars. The primary objective of this analysis was to corroborate or 
contradict the information provided by those interviewed. However, the guidelines 
also provided concrete examples on subjects that had been only vaguely referred to in 
the interviews and clarified many of the descriptions provided by the interviewees. 
Moreover, they contributed a more specific outline of certain parts of the process of 
developing the guidelines, for instance by specifically stating all the contributing 
member states. 
 
4.3 Limitations 
Much of the literature critical of the implementation pace of the Women, Peace and 
Security Resolutions refer to the UN system as a whole, and the more explicit of these, 
such as Raven-Roberts (2005), places the reason for the pace solely on the internal 
workings of UN organizations. The theoretical perspectives on organized hypocrisy 
introduced in chapter three dismiss that IOs such as the UN can be analyzed as a 
unitary actor. Rather, it is made up of groups and individuals with distinct interests and 
agendas. I only focus on the process of creating gender guidelines for military 
peacekeepers at the DPKO, in other words, one specific process within a single unit of 
the UN organization. My conclusions will therefore not necessarily be valid for other 
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parts of the UN system, as their relationship with the rest of the organization and other 
stakeholders may be very different. However, my analysis may provide a more 
complete understanding of the apparent lack of coherence between rhetoric and 
practice when it comes to implementing the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions 
at the DPKO and in peacekeeping operations by including the UN member states’ and 
other outside actors’ potential influence on this process. It can also explore the DPKO 
staff’s potential for initiating and advancing organizational change. 
I do not aim at presenting an “objective” account of the relationship between the 
DPKO and other central stakeholders in this implementation process. My goal was to 
understand how this process is seen from the point of reference of those involved in 
this work at the DPKO. Personnel on the ground in peacekeeping operations, 
representatives from TCCs and other stakeholders might perceive the process very 
differently.  
 
4.4 Ethical Considerations 
While there are a number of guidelines to advise social scientists who make use of 
qualitative interviews as a method of data collection, Kvale (2001) stresses that these 
do not offer a blueprint to all the situations that might demand ethical considerations 
from the researcher. The researcher must therefore consider the ethical implications of 
a specific research project throughout the research process. This section will outline 
my effort to comply with the relevant ethical guidelines concerned with research on 
individuals offered by the National Committee for Research Ethics in the Social 
Sciences and the Humanities (NESH: 2009). Of these, informed consent and 
confidentiality proved most important to my interviewees.  
Informed consent refers to the researcher’s obligation to give information about the 
research project’s goals and design, in a manner understandable to the participant. 
Participants should also be made aware that they may withdraw from participating at 
any point or choose not to answer individual questions. Confidentiality refers to 
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preserving the anonymity of those informants that wish to remain so and to limiting 
access to information that was given in confidence.  
I began the interview process by supplying the informants with a letter, either via e-
mail or when we met, which gave a short description of my project and outlined their 
rights to withdraw or withhold information and how I intended to ensure the 
confidentiality of the participants. The full text of the letter can be found in appendix 
III of this paper. However, the information retrieved during the interviews 
continuingly introduced subjects of interest, something that gradually changed the 
focus of the thesis. At the beginning of all the interviews I therefore also offered a 
more comprehensive account of my project and answered any questions the 
interviewees had. During these conversations and after the interview, several of my 
informants asserted reluctance to have parts of the information and descriptions they 
provided included in the published thesis, such as negative accounts of the 
performance of specific individuals, organizations or member countries. Several of the 
informants asked for these kinds of omissions on account of the challenges in ensuring 
the confidentiality of the participants, due to the small number of people working 
directly with implementing these Resolutions. Recognition of the individual 
participants could consequently have been a risk. This was discussed and solved with 
the individual interviewees.  
One of the interviewees for instance decided against being tape-recorded, so that she 
could express her opinions more freely, even though none of the names of the 
interviewees were included in the transcripts and the recording and transcripts and 
notes will be destroyed after the thesis is completed and graded, after having been 
accessible only to the external examiners and myself. Two other interviewees 
preferred not to be quoted in the written thesis. Their answers were therefore 
rephrased, rather than presented as direct quotes in my analysis. All interviewees were 
also offered final approval of all direct quotes made use of in the paper. While I 
discussed my findings with three of my Norwegian informants in order to validate my 
conclusions, this was always in a very generalized form, so as not to reveal the identity 
of other interviewees.  
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Having to omit negative views of central stakeholders and not always being able to 
support my findings with direct quotes made the mode of presentation in the analysis 
somewhat complicated. However, this was necessary in order to ensure both consent 
and confidentiality. On the other hand, not taking this into consideration before 
conducting the interviews would most likely have influenced the kind of statements 
the participants would have felt at liberty to make and thereby attenuated the findings 
even more.  
    
4.5 Mode of Analysis 
The literature critical of the implementation process in the UN and the theoretical 
perspectives on organized hypocrisy and organizational change in IOs informed many 
of the topics included in the interview guide, as well as the analysis of the interview 
data. My aim was to understand how the DPKO tried to change how the military 
peacekeepers in UN missions operate, and who or what they perceived as assisting or 
constraining them in this process. This was, in other words, an effort to change 
attitudes and practices in one part of the organization by another part of the 
organization. Due to the specific nature of the relationship between the UN and its 
member states when it comes to the deployment of military peacekeepers, this entailed 
not only influencing the soldiers themselves, but also the TCCs who are responsible 
for pre-deployment training, including teaching the soldiers about the tenets of these 
Resolutions. Formally, the wishes of the member states determine the actions of the 
DPKO and neither the DPKO nor the other UN organizations can force the UN 
member states to do anything they do not want to do. However, Weaver (2008), and 
Barnett and Finnemore (2004), argue that in reality IO staff has the ability to initiate 
organizational change and influence member states.  
In my analysis of the relationship between the DPKO team trying to implement the 
Women, Peace and Security Agenda and the rest of the DPKO and other stakeholders, 
I examined whether the DPKO staff had agency independent from member states and 
also this agency was exercised in a specific process: the development of the 
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DFS/DPKO Gender Guidelines for military peacekeepers. As outlined in my 
description of the DPKO’s formal structure, this development process, as well as the 
guidelines’ eventual implementation is dependent on the DPKO, the UN and the 
member states. How these actors enabled and constrained this work, and if and how 
the team responsible for the guidelines tried to influence them is central to my analysis 
When analyzing the interviews with current and former DPKO personnel, I followed a 
set of analytical criteria. These included:  
1) Descriptions of the process of developing the guidelines.  
2) Descriptions of how the DPKO personnel tried to influence the TCCs and other 
important actors.  
3) Descriptions of the limits, both formal and informal, of their influence.  
4) How they considered their work to be influenced by the other central stakeholders.  
5) Descriptions of the relationship between the DPKO and other stakeholders they 
wished to cooperate with to expedite the implementation process.  
I compare these findings with a textual analysis of the final guidelines and the 
perspectives provided in the interviews with the Norwegian bureaucrats and diplomats, 
looking for statements that contradicted, corroborated or explained the findings from 
the primary interviews and guidelines.  
In my textual analysis of the DPKO/DFS Gender Guidelines I looked specifically for:  
1) Descriptions of the process of developing the guidelines.  
2) Statements on why and how gender mainstreaming was presented as important.  
The empirical findings commencing from this analysis will be presented in the next 
chapter. 
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5. Empirical Findings 
The empirical findings presented in this chapter are based primarily on the interviews 
with current and former DPKO personnel. These findings were compared to and re-
analyzed with the findings from the interviews with Norwegian diplomats, bureaucrats 
and scholars and the text analysis of the completed gender guidelines, as specified 
throughout the text and in the footnotes. What emerged from my analysis was that the 
DPKO personnel developing the DPKO/DFS Gender Guidelines had three main 
strategies to advance this effort, persistence, alliance building and framing, around 
which this chapter is organized. Their descriptions also revealed that their efforts faced 
obstacles and resistance from various actors, which I will describe in context of the 
strategies that were used to overcome them. These strategies, points of resistance and 
obstacles show that other actors had a lot of influence over the DPKO team’s work. 
Towards the end of the chapter, I depict how the interviewees perceive the criticism 
advanced against the implementation process at the DPKO. But first I outline the 
formal process of developing the gender guidelines. 
 
5.1 The Formal Development Process  
According to the completed guidelines, the process of developing the gender 
guidelines was a collaboration between the OMA and the Gender Unit, building on the 
earlier efforts to implement the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions at the DPKO 
(DPKO/DFS 2010: 5). Both units contributed personnel to a working group in charge 
of coordinating a dialogue and writing process. The group therefore included staff with 
professional backgrounds from both the civilian and military parts of peacekeeping 
missions. The process began with a consultation trip to UN peacekeeping missions in 
Syria, Darfur/Sudan, Lebanon and Haiti, to consult “with the military, personnel from 
other peacekeeping components, UN partner entities, local authorities and civilian 
population” (DPKO/DFS 2010: 3). The draft of the guidelines emanating from this trip 
was then distributed to all peacekeeping missions for their input (DPKO/DFS 2010: 3). 
The next and final step was to involve representatives from 14 TCCs, the African 
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Union, the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as well as 
from the NGO community “to review and validate the draft guidelines” (DPKO/DFS 
2010: 3). 
  
5.2 The Interviewees’ Description of the Development Process 
The interviewees’ explained that in reality, developing the guidelines was a much 
longer and more complicated process. The process can be divided into three 
interconnected phases.  
The first step was the effort to get permission to develop guidelines from the DPKO 
leadership and member states, and to build political support from those who would 
eventually implement the guidelines: the member states, the DPKO leadership and 
military personnel at the DPKO and in the field. As contributors of troops, as well as 
political and financial support, it was paramount that the member states supported the 
agenda. According to one of the interviewees from the OMA, some countries agreed to 
the central tenets of the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions. Other countries 
considered them to be important, but had yet to make progress with the 
implementation
10
. There were, however, also TCCs, both from the global South and 
North, who in reality did not support this agenda at all
11
.  
The initial part of the influencing process was consequently to convince TCCs and the 
other member states instructing the funding and formal priorities of the DPKO that the 
tenets of the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions were important. Also a lot of 
the civilian and military personnel at the DPKO headquarters and in peacekeeping 
missions had to be convinced. Getting the military staff onboard was particularly 
important, as it is the formal responsibility of the missions’ military contingents to 
implement the guidelines at the operational and tactical level in the field. In a situation 
with limited funds and capacity, the field personnel must understand and prioritize the 
gender guidelines if they were to be actually, rather than just rhetorically, 
                                                
10
 According to a current member of the OMA. 
11
 According to two of the current members of the Gender Unit and one member of the OMA. All my Norwegian 
interviewees implicitly or explicitly corroborated this view. 
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implemented. As I will describe below, the Gender Unit initially faced political 
resistance and other obstacles from both member states and military and civilian UN 
staff, and therefore had to work strategically to obtain the support and funding it 
needed in order to initiate the development process. 
The second step was developing a set of guidelines that were practically, economically 
and politically feasible to implement. As outlined in the background chapter, many of 
the provisions in the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions depend on the capacity 
and political will of the TCCs. For instance, the Resolutions instruct the DPKO to 
increase the number of women in high-level positions within the organization and in 
missions. However, it is the member states that nominate and promote personnel to 
these positions. As member states want to have people who will promote their interests 
in high-level positions, there are considerable political ramifications to the 
employment process
12
. The Resolutions also asks the TCCs to increase their number of 
female military peacekeepers and to train their troops in the central tenets of the 
Women, Peace, and Security agenda before deployment. As most TCCs currently have 
few women in their national armies, this would imply restructuring their national 
recruitment processes. The DPKO is, however, not in a position to demand anything. 
As stated by a current member of the Gender Unit:  
…we can’t tell member states what to do, we can’t […] say; you must have more women. I mean, 
that’s not going to happen. Politically you can’t do that. You can suggest more women would be 
useful…  
Even though a current member of OMA stressed that the DPKO have already had 
some success in increasing the number of women military personnel, this increase has 
not been as great as the OMA hoped and expected. The current and former DPKO staff 
highlighted Rwanda, South Africa and Sweden as countries that were good at gender 
training and deploying female peacekeepers. However, the challenge is not only to 
increase the number of women.  
                                                
12
 According to a former member of the Gender Unit and all but two of the Norwegian diplomats, bureaucrats 
and scholars. 
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…it’s how they are being deployed as well… Not just that they are sending women, but that they are 
sending women to do the job they are trained for.
13
  
Some countries deploy fully trained female soldiers but use them only as cooks or 
medics. However, if the gender guidelines are to be effectively implemented, the 
gender guidelines had to be seen as being legitimate and actively prioritized not only 
by the TCCs, but also by donor countries, the DPKO leadership and high-level 
military personnel. Developing the guidelines was therefore partly an effort to 
maintain political and financial support, for instance through rounds of consultation 
and verification by the other stakeholders. 
The third stage is the formal and practical implementation. As this stage of the process 
has just begun, only the two first parts of the process is the focus of this thesis. 
However, anticipated obstacles and resistance in the third step influenced the staff’s 
work with the other two.  
The descriptions from the guidelines and by the interviewees show that even though 
the Best Practices’ Gender Team was formally responsible for developing gender 
guidelines for military peacekeepers, the process was permeated by other central 
stakeholders, most significantly representatives from peacekeeping missions, military 
personnel at the DPKO and member states. As I will elaborate on below, the 
involvement of these actors represented both boundaries and resources for the DPKO 
team’s efforts to develop the guidelines.  
 
5.3 Strategies and Obstacles 
All the informants interviewed for this thesis placed emphasis on the role played by 
the member states. The interviewees working, or formerly working, at the DPKO 
stressed that the member states “own” the UN, as well as the Women, Peace, and 
Security Resolutions. Without their consent, the Resolutions, including the military 
gender guidelines, cannot be implemented. In addition, the DPKO leadership and the 
high level military personnel both at the headquarters and in peacekeeping missions 
                                                
13
 Current member of the DPKO Gender Team. 
54 
 
could formally and informally restrict the DPKO Gender Team’s influence over the 
finished guidelines and their implementation. While some representatives among these 
stakeholders were supporters of the Women, Peace, and Security agenda, others 
objected. Four obstacles or causes of resistance could be distinguished throughout the 
development process: “the protection of civilians” agenda, resistance against women’s 
empowerment, lack of coordination and conceptual confusion
14
. 
However, the informants’ descriptions revealed that the interests and actions of the 
DPKO personnel responsible for the gender guidelines were influenced, but not 
determined, by these restrictions. As described below, the members of the team used a 
number of methods to influence the rest of the organization and the member states, 
which demonstrated various forms of agency. Drawing on the strategies introduced by 
Barnett and Finnemore (2004), Joachim (2003) and Weaver (2008), the informants’ 
descriptions fall into three principal influencing strategies: persistence, alliance 
building and framing, which the DPKO team employed against the restrictions and 
obstacles. Persistence denotes being patient and not ceding in the face of political 
resistance and practical obstacles, but rather waiting for circumstances to change. 
Alliance building implies creating and maintaining alliances with other supporters of 
the Women, Peace, and Security agenda to convince audiences over whom the Gender 
Team had little influence. As explained by Barnett and Finnemore (2004), framing 
means trying to influence how other actors perceive a problem, event or phenomenon. 
How these three strategies were employed, the types of resistance the strategies were 
met with and which stakeholders the strategies were aimed at, all changed during the 
stages of the development. I describe this in detail below. 
 
5.4 Persistence 
The Gender Unit had to be persistent in their advocacy to gain permission to develop 
the military gender guidelines. All the interviewees formerly or currently working at 
the UN stressed that this was a slow, step-by-step process. As stated by a current 
                                                
14
 These were either explicitly or implicitly referred to by all the informants interviewed for this thesis. 
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member of the Gender Team: “I mean, the UN is snail-like, [everything] takes 
forever…”  
This was not only because of a lack of political support, but also because gender 
mainstreaming had not been particularly advanced at the DPKO before the initial 
Women, Peace, and Security Resolution, UNSCR 1325, was adopted. The 
implementation process was in other words a formidable task. 
[UNSCR] 1325 […] was a watershed... It was the first time women had been afforded this status 
within conflict […] the idea that women are impacted differently by conflict than men. They had never 
thought about this. Prior to 1325 gender had never been institutionalized within peacekeeping, only in 
ad hoc things…  
According to the informants at the DPKO Gender Unit the process of developing 
gender guidelines was initiated as early as 2005 by the DPKO gender advisor that 
worked on Women, Peace, and Security related issues before the Gender Team was 
established, but at that time she was unable to move forward with the process.  
 [The development process] has been going on for quite a while…Since 2005…when [name of gender 
advisor], who at the time was the gender adviser for the unit took it to the military [but] it wasn’t a 
good time at that point
15
.  
What was lacking, according to a former member of the DPKO Gender Unit, was 
sufficient political support from the Department’s leadership and military components, 
as well as that of the member states controlling the budget and determining the formal 
priorities of the DPKO. This perspective was confirmed by two other DPKO 
employees, who argued that the Women, Peace, and Security agenda was much less 
accepted when the DPKO gender advisor first initiated the gender guidelines. This 
would change over the next couple of years.  
 You need to have the right time politically, the money, people’s understanding. Remember, in 2005 
gender wasn’t as advanced as it is now
16
.   
                                                
15
 Member of the DPKO Gender Unit. 
16
 Member of the DPKO Gender Unit. 
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In 2007 the conversation about the gender guidelines was brought up again, both by 
the DPKO gender advisor and other stakeholders
17
. At that point the Gender Unit was 
still very small. According to a former member of the Gender Unit, it consisted of only 
“one person, [name of gender advisor] and a consultant […], and an administrative 
assistant”, but there had been a marked change in how gender issues were perceived, 
both among member states and in the DPKO. A former member of the Gender Unit 
highlights the efforts of the person who were the Department’s gender advisor at the 
time, lobbying for both funding and political support. Her work was also emphasized 
by two current members of the Gender Unit. However, the gender advisor also relied 
on the help of other stakeholders to advocate the need for military gender guidelines. 
 
5.5 Alliance-building 
Supporters of the Women, Peace, and Security agenda among member states, 
international and national NGOs other parts of the UN organization also lobbied those 
more reluctant among the member states and in the UN system
18
.  
…the NGO community has been very active; they have lobbied a great deal… Several member states 
have also contributed… the EU-group, for example, in C34, and also Australia. Several of these 
groups have worked all the time in order to get [gender on the agenda of C34]
19
.  
The result was that gender training and the Women, Peace and Security Resolutions 
finally became a part of the yearly report by the General Assembly’s Special 
Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34), which sets the official priorities of the 
DPKO. A former member of the Gender Unit maintained that this report informs the 
priorities of the DPKO also in practice, which is why the different teams work so hard 
to get their agenda included in it.  
                                                
17
 There is some disagreement between my informants as to who initiated the process the second time. One of 
the Norwegian bureaucrats interviewed for this thesis suggested that another UN agency had advocated the 
DPKO to develop military guidelines. Another Norwegian bureaucrat argued that the process had been initiated 
because of advocacy by UN staff and military personnel in the field. A former and two current members of the 
Gender Unit pointed to the DPKO gender advisor. 
18
 According to two current and one former member of the DPKO Gender Team. This was also confirmed by 
two of the Norwegian bureaucrats. 
19
 Former member of the Gender Unit. 
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The additional tasks meant that the already overworked Gender Advisor needed a 
more substantial team
20
. To achieve this, the gender team relied on supporters among 
the member states. The Gender Unit was expanded with one person over the regular 
budget approved by the General Assembly’s Fifth Committee. Going through the 
regular budget process is, however, considered the most difficult way to expand your 
team.  
Had we gone through the regular budget process in the UN, then we hadn’t been anywhere near where 
we are now...it is just so much competition [for funds]
21
.  
The competition to be in the budget proposed by the DPKO is only the first hurdle. 
According to a former member of the Gender Unit, it is also difficult to get increases 
in personnel past the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly who authorizes the 
DPKO’s budgets. They would therefore also ask member states benevolent to the 
Women, Peace, and Security agenda to sponsor new positions outside the regular 
budgets.   
…parts of the DPKO chooses to go directly to donors [for funds]”
22
. “Norway, Sweden, Finland […] 
the Netherlands, [and] the UK are the primary supporters of the [Gender] Team”. Sometimes, these 
temporary positions become such an integral part of the organization structure that they are eventually 
funded over the regular budget, but most of the time this does not happen. The Unit is consequently 
very vulnerable to changes in donor priorities
23
.  
The Gender Unit also made use of support from within the DPKO. According to two 
current members of the Gender Unit, promoting gender issues within the organization 
is very much dependent on the commitment and connections of individuals. Or as a 
current member of the gender team phrased it, “getting the right people at the right 
time”. This view is confirmed by a former member of the Gender Unit, who described 
how the former Under-Secretary-General and one of his special assistants became 
increasingly attentive to gender issues, something that had positive effects for the 
                                                
20
 A former member of the Gender Unit described the gender advisor as “desperate”. 
21
 Former member of the Gender Unit. 
22
 Former member of the Gender Unit. 
23
 According to a former member of the Gender Unit. 
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Women, Peace, and Security agenda both within the organization, and among the 
member states.  
Effective advocacy was also dependent on reformulating the abstract ideas about 
gender and equality featured in the Resolutions into concrete measures that seemed 
relevant to military personnel who often had little prior knowledge about these types 
of issues. The Gender Unit often cooperated with designated military personnel to 
create a common frame of reference with military audiences. Sometimes, relying on 
someone with a military rank was mandatory to get the message through.  
…when working in the field, you do come up against people who simply don’t want to take you 
seriously […].  If you’re talking to the military, doesn’t matter how justified, […] if you’re not 
wearing a uniform, they tend to not listen to you anyway.  And I think that’s why it’s critical to get 
[…] men in uniform talking to men in uniform, because then they listen
24.  
A current member of the Gender Team had seen this in practice more than once, and 
provided the following example.  
When we went to Darfur, we went in pairs, always a military person and a civilian. We sat around the 
table and my colleague was with me, who was a man, but wasn’t wearing his uniform, he’s a colonel 
[…] there were ten military officers around the table. The dismissiveness of them at first was quite 
appalling, until he turned around and said that his name was Colonel […], and then they started 
listening […]. It wasn’t about him being a man, but it was about him being a soldier […] and that is 
critical.  
In addition to working with military staff and member states, the Gender Unit 
consulted with civilian personnel from peacekeeping missions and other UN 
organizations. In 2008 UNIFEM
25
, DPKO and DFS, on behalf of UN Action
26
, 
organized a conference to discuss military peacekeepers’ role in protecting women and 
girls from sexual violence (UNIFEM 2008). The conference was attended by high-
level military staff from UN peacekeeping missions and defense ministries of member 
states, UN personnel from relevant departments, including the DPKO and members of 
                                                
24
 Current member of the Gender Unit. 
25
 United Nations Development Fund for Women 
26
 The aim of UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict is to coordinate the efforts of the UN entities 
working to combat sexual violence in war (UN Action 2010). 
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the NGO community. The point of the conference was to learn about existing efforts 
by military peacekeepers, but also to establish agreement about the political agenda
27
. 
UNIFEM and UN Action continued the “analytical inventory” of existing efforts by 
military peacekeepers without the DPKO. These efforts were later incorporated into 
the guidelines
28
. 
The Gender Unit was by then writing drafts of the gender guidelines. Moreover, the 
Working Group, which included members of the OMA, had been established. This 
made sure that the people who, together with the Gender Unit, were eventually going 
to implement the guidelines at the headquarters level were involved in the writing 
process
29
. Before beginning the consultation and validation process described in the 
gender guidelines the Working Group also consulted further with high-level military 
staff from ongoing peace operations who would be responsible for implementation in 
the field
30
. 
In other words, the Gender Team created alliances with member states and UN civilian 
and military personnel in order to convince other members of the same groups of the 
importance of the military gender guidelines. However, inclusion was also done out of 
necessity; without it, those who would eventually implement the guidelines would not 
perceive the guidelines as legitimate. Moreover, both creating and maintaining these 
alliances demanded pragmatism and willingness to compromise. 
 
5.5.1 Compromising to Create and Maintain Alliances 
The DPKO Gender Team wished to include as many of the central stakeholders as 
possible early in the process, including military personnel at the UN headquarters, 
representatives from TCCs, donor countries and the civilian and military parts of 
peacekeeping missions. Through their input and reviews, the finished product would 
reflect the political and practical reservations that would otherwise obstruct 
                                                
27
 According to one of the Norwegian bureaucrats and the summary of the official conference report (Goetz & 
Anderson 2008) 
28
 According to a current member of the DPKO Gender Unit and one of the Norwegian bureaucrats. 
29
 According to a current employee at the Office of Military Affairs and a member of the DPKO Gender Unit. 
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implementation
31
. The inclusive process was also meant to give the main stakeholders 
a sense of ownership to the gender guidelines and the implementation process.  
…yes, this was the process by which we sought to ensure ownership by [the military] and by these 
member states. And the feedback we’ve received so far is quite positive…
32
.  
Without it, the process would collapse the moment the Gender Unit and other 
advocates stopped pushing
33
. However, this also meant being pragmatic about what 
the finished gender guidelines would look like. One of the Norwegian bureaucrats 
interviewed stressed that including TCCs in a process such as this necessitates 
humility.  
Yeah, you have to be modest and recognize what [the TCCs] can contribute with. There is no point in 
having Indians and Bangladeshis sit and listen to some guy from the UN [headquarters] telling them 
how to do things in the Congo, when it is the Indians who have had the MONUC
34
 police 
commissioner in the DRC for many years
35
.  
Two of the current members of the Gender Unit also emphasized the importance of 
basing the guidelines on the experiences of those in the field. However, TCCs and UN 
personnel often had differing experiences from the field and contradicting perspectives 
on the Resolutions. Moreover, creating the guidelines had to include perspectives from 
other important stakeholders as well, such as donor countries
36
. In order to balance 
these perspectives, the finished text had to be vague enough to be politically viable, 
but concrete enough to make them relevant for peacekeepers on the ground. For the 
DPKO personnel coordinating the process and writing the guidelines this often implied 
cutting measures they considered important and continuous rewrites. The guidelines 
have accordingly received some criticism for being toothless and vague
37
.  
As mentioned above, the validation process included visits to several missions and 
input from all, as well as a large session in December 2009, where the TCCs could 
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35
 My translation. 
36
 According to two informants currently working in the Gender Unit. 
37
 This criticism was raised by two of the Norwegian bureaucrats. 
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review the draft of the guidelines. The sessions included representatives from Rwanda, 
Senegal, Nigeria, France, Mali, Bangladesh, Pakistan and India. “Basically three from 
each region of troop contributing countries”
38
. The consultation and review process 
drastically altered the draft of the guidelines
39
.  
My goodness, [we made] incredible, incredible changes. From the very first draft until now, it’s not 
anything like it was. I mean, you’re putting in the things that you do, but then they say no […] Things 
that you may want, but wouldn’t be possible… We’ve been through, I think, ten drafts… [It] will 
probably change again before it’s published this month
40
.  
The alterations were made as a result of practical, budgetary or political obstacles and 
objections from those who were consulted as a part of the process. Practical obstacles 
were explained as measures that seemed like a good idea in New York, but would not 
be feasible in the field, such as having “medical gynecologists on [all] level two 
hospitals”
41
.  Budgetary objections included initiatives that were too expensive to 
include in all UN peace missions. Political objections were directed at efforts that 
could not be implemented because they were not included in mission mandates, and 
were not likely to ever be because of opposition from certain TCCs and other member 
states. These objections were sometimes linked to broader issues that are contentious 
for some member states, such as women’s empowerment and human security
42
, which 
I will return to later in this chapter. These objections, however, eventually became less 
prominent due to events and advocacy outside the DPKO, things which are also easier 
for the DPKO team to find supporters among the stakeholders. 
 
5.5.2 Change in the Normative Context 
The DPKO team’s strategic alliance building benefited from the advocacy of 
supporters of the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions outside the DPKO and 
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events outside the DPKO staff’s control, which changed the normative context of their 
efforts.  
For instance, the particular vulnerability of women and girls in violent conflict made 
the international agenda as a result of graphic media and NGO reports of sexual 
violence, especially from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The moral 
imperative of ”doing something” to end the war rapes in the DRC was mentioned by 
all my informants. It was also argued that media attention about these issues had 
greatly boosted the number of supporters of the Women, Peace, and Security agenda. 
Because of the increased attention and pressure, the agenda gained an increasing 
number of supporters willing to exert their influence on the agenda’s behalf, most 
notably the USA. The increasing willingness by governments to fund related projects 
also attracted a number of NGOs to the movement, which again made sure to increase 
the attention and pressure further
43
. The DPKO team’s advocacy of the development 
of gender guidelines for military peacekeepers was in other words a part of a much 
wider effort by various actors among member states, NGOs and within the UN 
structure to get the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions implemented. As 
described in the background chapter of this thesis, this was a coordinated effort to get 
UNSCR 1325 adopted, which only expanded after the initial victory. The DPKO 
Gender Unit was a part of this informal alliance. According to a current member of the 
OMA and all the Norwegian bureaucrats and diplomats interviewed for this thesis, the 
result of these efforts was that the Resolutions could no longer be ignored, and 
member states that in reality might oppose them, had to at least pay rhetorical homage 
to their central tenets. The consequence for the staff advocating the gender guidelines 
for military peacekeepers was increased recognition from both the member states 
responsible for their budgets and official priorities and among the DPKO leadership.  
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5.5.3 Lack of Coordination 
At the same time as the advocates progressed in influencing the attitudes of central 
stakeholders, they also became increasingly divided. The prominence of UNSCR 1820 
and 1888 over the rest of the Resolutions led to disagreement, reinforcing tensions that 
already existed. While NGOs, member states and UN personnel cooperate in their 
efforts to get the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions recognized and 
implemented, these efforts have at times been characterized by a lack of 
coordination
44
. According to one of the former members of the Gender Unit, the UN 
effort to implement the Resolutions have been characterized by clashes over 
responsibilities, funds and strong personalities, something that might have undermined 
the lobbying power of the movement. One of the Norwegian scholars interviewed for 
this thesis argued that signs of this could be found in the two Resolutions that were 
adopted in 2009; UNSCR 1888, which focuses on sexual violence, was both more 
concrete and more rhetorically forceful compared to UNSCR 1889, which highlights 
women’s empowerment and participation. Two of the interviewees currently working 
in the DPKO Gender Team implicitly elaborated on the effects of this division. They 
described how certain measures in the two latest Resolutions that the DPKO was to 
become responsible for, had been successfully advocated by an alliance of NGOs and 
another UN organization. While the DPKO personnel lauded their general lobbying 
efforts, they agued that these measures would only duplicate efforts already in place in 
missions and would result in time and funds spent placating unnecessary instructions.  
Both the current and the former members of the Gender Unit expressed frustration 
over the influence of UN organizations and NGOs without contact with the people 
working in peacekeeping missions. The result could sometimes be instructions and 
demands that were not possible to implement in the field, which complicated the 
relationship between advocates in different UN entities, as well as the Gender Team’s 
relationship and legitimacy with military and civilian peacekeepers who had to 
implement these measures. A former member of the DPKO Gender Unit mentioned 
the increasing call for more reporting as an instruction that could counteract effective 
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implementation. While she held that reporting was an important responsibility, the 
gender teams in the field spent an increasing amount of time reporting on issues that 
are exceedingly difficult to measure.  
…those poor people out there, who already are completely overworked, if you ask them to report 
twice as much as they do today it is obvious that they will soon have time to do nothing but report. 
And this is just one example of how differently we see these things. Still, I get where they’re coming 
from […], I mean, much is being done in the field but from the HQ it might seem as if nothing is 
happening […] 
45
.  
Many in the NGO community also had unrealistic expectations when it came to what 
could possibly be achieved within the political constraints the DPKO faced from the 
member states.  
I mean, you engage, you consult, but you certainly can’t have activists making policy, who don’t 
understand the UN, don’t understand the political ramifications, don’t understand any of these things. 
You can consult, absolutely, but you can’t have them leading UN agencies. That just doesn’t make 
sense!
46
  
The result is that parts of the NGO community criticize the UN rather than the member 
states that could actually rectify the situation.  
…what they fail to do is say: the UN is made up of my country, my country isn’t going fast enough, 
I’m not giving enough troops, I’m not giving enough money. Because the UN isn’t on its own. It’s 
made up of the countries that all of these activists live in and therefore they need to be pushing their 
own countries to move forward […]. [We] can only go as far as the member states allows. And that’s 
the problem, that people seem to think that the UN is a separate entity to everything else and it’s not
47
.  
However, according to one of the former members of the Gender Team, the DPKO 
team was as guilty of protecting their own interests and resources as other UN 
organizations, thereby contributing to the division of the alliance.  
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I’m sorry to say that the DPKO sometimes have been too much “no, this is our thing” [when other UN 
organizations try to get involved in gender related peacekeeping tasks]. It really is ridiculous, but these 
things become hugely important…  
This frustration and division is, on the other hand, described as insignificant compared 
to the benefits of the other advocates pushing the Woman, Peace, and Security agenda. 
The UN is also currently working to integrate the efforts of the different parts of the 
organization into the new entity UN Women. My informants from the Gender Team 
hoped this would make the lack of coordination less of a problem 
48
. 
Persistence and alliance building helped the DPKO team gather political and financial 
support, as well as contribute to the legitimacy of the military gender guidelines. The 
goal was to create long-term changes in both the attitudes and practice of the DPKO 
and the other central stakeholders and the tenets of the Women, Peace, and Security 
agenda had to become integrated into the institutional framework and formal 
procedures of peacekeeping operations. Consequently, all the stakeholders involved 
had to perceive the Resolutions as legitimate and important. That way, implementation 
would continue even if the outside pressure desisted. In order to achieve this among 
stakeholders who initially disagreed to the agenda, the DPKO team used framing. 
 
5.6 Framing  
Framing as a strategy was central in both stages of the development process. In order 
to gain permission to develop gender guidelines at all, the team had to overcome both 
political obstacles and untangle confusion about what the Women, Peace, and Security 
agenda really meant to military peacekeepers. Framing was central to achieving this. 
The strategy also remained important afterwards, when the guidelines were developed.  
More specifically, the Gender Unit reframed the Women, Peace, and Security 
Resolutions from a normative question to an agenda that was of strategic advantage to 
military peacekeepers. As stated by one of the current members of the Gender team:  
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…you have to prove that there is an added value. Especially when you are talking to military types or 
the police, you have to [explain] what is the added value. It isn’t about [the number of women or] 
equality in it self, it’s about saying, you can for instance search women, there’s a strategic objective to 
it all, there is an operational objective to it…  
Accordingly, the Gender Team can argue that implementing the Resolutions in the 
work of military peacekeepers is not only instructed by the Security Council, it will in 
fact help military peacekeepers to accomplish other tasks which were considered to be 
important among reluctant member states and military personnel. This gave the agenda 
legitimacy among people who had disregarded it before.  
I think you always have to make a valid justification of the linkage to make it understood, otherwise 
it’s not getting credibility. Gender isn’t automatically a credible subject as it is. 
49
  
Both the current and the former members of the Gender Team argued the shift from a 
rights-based approach to a focus on operational efficiency ensured that the agenda got 
“the grown-up table’s attention”
50
. Reframing the Women, Peace, and Security 
Resolutions as essential for operational success helped the DPKO reduce the influence 
of three of the factors that initially contributed to resistance against the agenda from 
some of the stakeholders: conceptual confusion, resistance against women’s 
empowerment and the “protection of civilians” agenda. 
 
5.6.1 Conceptual Confusion 
According to one of the interviewees from OMA, the initial resistance among most 
military stakeholders and some of the member states was more due to conceptual 
confusion than to actual dissent. Two of the interviewees from the OMA argued that 
many among the military personnel had problems seeing how the Resolutions were 
relevant for their work and how they could be effectively operationalized. Translating 
the Resolutions into language that made sense for military personnel was therefore an 
important step to gaining their political support. 
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We’ve had 10 years of training and discussing and developing training modules, and all differed kinds 
of publications, not just from peacekeeping but the wider UN and international community on 
Resolution 1325, so it’s [no longer] an issue of ignorance at all… [Now] everybody knows about 
gender mainstreaming, pretty much…
51
  
However, information about the Resolutions was not enough. A former member of the 
Gender Team stressed that the initial resistance could also be traced back to the early 
advocates’ failure to make the Resolutions relevant for those who did not 
automatically agree.  
A lot of these women came from the NGO community, they knew a lot about women’s rights and so 
on, [they were more] watchdogs than communicators. It’s pretty obvious that when you are talking to 
a general, it might not be the best idea to bang your fist on the table and say that this is my right just as 
much as yours, women and men are equal […]. How you present things is important.  
However, the Resolutions also faced political resistance.   
 
5.6.2 Resistance against Women’s Empowerment 
As described above, attitudes towards the Women, Peace, and Security agenda among 
member states, DPKO and military personnel were diverse, and varied from strong 
supporters to outright opponents. The Resolutions were, however, not equally 
controversial. The Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions prescribe both measures 
to empower and protect women. UNSCR 1820 and 1888, focusing solely on sexual 
and gender-based violence, receive more political and financial support by important 
member states
52
. UNSCR 1325 and 1889, which focuses more clearly on promoting 
women’s participation and empowerment were much more contentious. According to 
two of the informants currently working in the DPKO Gender Unit, this was due to 
resistance against women’s empowerment.  
I think that there are some people who find the elements of empowerment a little frightening […] I 
think there is a lot of money [going] into sexual violence, again, because it’s about women as victims. 
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It is about doing something to help protect [them]. I think that when you ask for money to build up 
systems to push women to be in political parties or to have political caucuses, I think then you’re 
going to get resistance, because empowerment is very difficult...
53
  
The result of this resistance can be seen in what projects the member states are willing 
to back politically and financially.  
[If you want to include women] into peace agreements and not have amnesties for perpetrators, you 
are probably going to get a lot of resistance from a lot of people, […] you’re not going to get funding 
to do that. But if you want to set up a women’s shelter or you want medical equipment for women, 
absolutely, nobody would have a problem with that
54
.  
Also many of the stakeholders supporting the Resolutions favor efforts to combat 
sexual violence over the rest of the Women, Peace and Security agenda. Most 
influential among these is the USA, but also large parts of the NGO community and 
several UN organizations encourage this focus
55
. This is not a view shared by the 
DPKO or the Norwegian bureaucrats interviewed for this thesis. They, along with 
many in the NGO community, hold that that sexual violence can only be prevented 
through women’s empowerment. As stated by one of the current members of the 
DPKO Gender Unit:  
…it was never supposed to be either 1325 or 1820, but now […] the community has been galvanized 
towards one or the other. And I think that’s a very, very, very dangerous road to go down and I’m 
surprised that anybody who works in gender would push for that. Because […] they cannot be 
addressed individually, they must be addressed as a composite of the whole thing. A holistic approach.   
However, the DPKO team also had allies both among the member states and in the 
NGO community supporting for the empowerment mandates of the Resolutions. Many 
of these supporters were also supporters of the “protection of civilians” agenda
56
, 
which was opposed by many member states.  
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5.6.3 “Protection of Civilians”  
Many important TCCs and other member states initially perceived the Women, Peace, 
and Security Resolutions as a part of the “protection of civilians” agenda
57
, of which 
they were highly critical. The agenda, promoted by a number of member states and 
NGOs, argues that the humanitarian needs of civilians trumps consent, impartiality and 
the use of force only in self-protection as the central principles of peacekeeping. The 
opponents, many of whom have a history as colonies, fear that the agenda will be used 
to promote neo-imperialism and control over countries in the Global South
58
. 
Opposition to the “protection of civilians” agenda resulted in much initial skepticism 
to the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions. The consequence was that the DPKO 
Gender Unit was met with much resistance from these stakeholders when they initiated 
the military gender guidelines and other implementation efforts in the years after the 
adoption of UNSCR 1325
59
. While this tension was never resolved, it became less 
prominent as the Women, Peace, and Security agenda became more widely accepted 
among member states. The interviews with informants from both the DPKO and 
Norway all describe how in the years after 2005 the ideas promoted in the Resolutions 
became an international trend, which also greatly influenced the DPKO team’s efforts 
to dispel the resistance against women’s empowerment and conceptual confusion.  
 
5.6.4 Framing in the Second Stage of the Development Process 
Using framing to overcome conceptual confusion, resistance against women’s 
empowerment and the “protection of civilians” agenda was most prominent in the first 
stage of the development process, when the Gender Unit tried to gain permission to 
create gender guidelines. However, the strategy remained important later in the 
development process because of the turnover among personnel both in the UN and 
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among the alliance partners
60
. As a consequence, the DPKO team had to continuously 
build support for the agenda.  
The finished guidelines indicate that this work will remain important also in the third 
stage of implementing the guidelines. In addition to stressing that the Resolutions are 
instructions from the Security Council, the gender guidelines are scattered with what 
the Gender Unit staff referred to as “added value” justifications. This is especially the 
case when it comes to employing female peacekeepers, but also as a reason for why 
women’s organizations should be consulted by peacekeeping missions. The part of the 
guidelines aimed at strategic planning at the headquarters level for instance states:  
Women and men may have access to different kinds and sources of information relating to security 
risks and threats in the area of operation. Consequently, to obtain a holistic overview of the security 
environment, planning processes for UN peacekeeping missions need to consult and draw on the 
perspectives of both women and men… (DPKO/DFS 2010: 8).  
Another example is aimed at the operational level of peacekeeping missions: 
UN-CIMIC
61
 activities to promote confidence-building with the local population can be effectively 
implemented through consultations between the military and local women’s organizations in the area 
of operations (DPKO/DFS 2010: 17).  
Also the guidelines for the tactical level of operations in the field was characterized by 
this type of framing:  
The deployment of mixed teams [which includes both women and men] can lead to better military-
community interaction and dispel any mistrust between the UN military and the local community. By 
way of example, it could guard against fears of sexual exploitation and abuse of women and girls in 
the local population by military peacekeepers (DPKO/DFS 2010: 21). 
 
5.7 Completing the Gender Guidelines 
Seen together, the descriptions provided by the interviewees and the finished gender 
guidelines indicate that the DPKO staff had strategies to advance their agenda during 
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the first two steps of the development process. The DPKO leadership approved the 
final guidelines in March 2010 (DPKO/DFS 2010: 1). The next step of the process is 
the implementation of the guidelines in UN peacekeeping missions and at the DPKO 
headquarters in New York. The implementation in the field will be the responsibility 
of the military components of the peacekeeping missions, assisted by the mission 
Gender Advisors
62
. In New York, OMA and the Gender Unit will mainstream the 
gender guidelines into the existing framework for planning peacekeeping missions
63
. 
After three years, the gender guidelines will be evaluated, and revised if necessary
64
. 
Both getting permission and developing the guidelines depended on the member states 
and staff in other parts of the UN system, who also influenced the finished guidelines. 
Their resistance and the other obstacles described in this chapter might help explain 
the slow pace of implementing the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions at the 
DPKO.  
 
5.8 The Interviewees’ Assessment of the Pace of Implementation 
The interviewees currently or formerly working at the DPKO argued that the criticism 
against the slow pace of implementing the Women, Peace and Security Resolutions 
was unreasonable to some degree. As stated by a former member of the Gender Unit: 
If you look at the entire UN system […] the DPKO is in my opinion the UN entity that achieved the 
most. They have actually done the most [to implement the Women, Peace and Security Resolutions]. 
…they now have the formal stuff in place, and many don’t have that. They also have gender advisors 
in place in all their operations. 
They also acknowledged that that the UN is slow to incorporate new ideas and that this 
was partly a result of internal features of the organization itself. However, they all 
agreed that the resistance among member states and other central stakeholders were 
equally or more to blame. The interviewees among Norwegian scholars, bureaucrats 
and diplomats largely agreed with this stance.  
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Examining the criticism mounted against the implementation process at the DPKO is 
the focus of the next chapter, where I elaborate on how these empirical findings 
answer my primary and theoretical research questions and how these answers might 
help explain the belated Women, Peace, and Security implementing process. 
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6. Implications of Empirical Findings 
The focus of this chapter is to examine the slow implementation of the Women, Peace, 
and Security Resolutions at the DPKO, despite the UN’s rhetorical affirmation of this 
agenda. But first I elaborate on how the empirical findings from the last chapter 
answer my primary and theoretical research questions. As stated in the introduction, 
the primary research questions guiding this thesis are: What strategies did the team 
responsible for coordinating the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security 
Resolutions at the DPKO employ in their effort to implement this agenda in the work 
of military peacekeepers? And what contextual issues and actors did they see as 
constraining or aiding them in their effort? The aim of my theoretical research 
question is to understand in what ways member states shapes the actions of IO staff 
and whether IO staff can act independently from them. In order to answer these 
questions, I discuss my findings with regard to the theoretical perspectives presented 
in chapter three. I then return to how these answers help explain the belated 
implementation process. 
 
6.1 Strategies, Obstacles and Resistance to Creating Military Gender Guidelines 
My informants’ descriptions of the process of developing the gender guidelines 
convey that they had three principal strategies to get permission and develop the 
DPKO/DFS Gender Guidelines: persistence, alliance building and framing.  
Persistent lobbying of member states and the DPKO leadership was one of these 
strategies. Neorealists and neo-liberalists portray states’ interests as innate and contend 
that these direct IOs’ agendas. Barnett and Finnemore (2004) Joachim (2003) and 
Weaver (2008), on the other hand, all consider IOs to have interests independent from 
those of states and explore how actors’ interests and agendas are constructed and 
changeable, either through changes in circumstances or because they are influences by 
other actors. According to Joachim (2003) advocacy over time might benefit from 
events and changes in issues’ context, which changes how issues are perceived. This 
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view of interests as malleable to changes in issues’ normative context resonates with 
the descriptions of my interviewees who described how reports of extreme levels of 
sexual violence in the DRC made parts of the Women, Peace and Security agenda 
more urgent among many of the central stakeholders the DPKO tried to influence in 
their efforts to develop the gender guidelines. If the interests of the member states 
were inherent, changes in the agenda’s normative context would not have influenced 
their positions on the Resolutions. 
Alliance building was the second strategy employed by the DPKO team. Like the 
NGOs in Joachim’s (2003) article and the “norm entrepreneurs” in Finnemore and 
Sikkink’s (1998) work, the DPKO staff formed alliances with partners who had more 
authority in the eyes of their audience in order to overcome resistance. One example is 
having military personnel convince other military personnel of the importance and 
usefulness of the Women, Peace, and Security agenda. Alliance partners among 
member states, NGOs and UN military personnel were also used to convince TCCs 
and other member states. Along the lines of Joachim (2003), I would argue that 
member states and other stakeholders both aided and restricted the DPKO team’s 
framing efforts. However, cooperation and resistance is often not in accordance with 
the formal boundaries between IOs, NGOs and member states. Instead, alliances of 
actors from the UN, member states and civil society try to influence other actors from 
the UN, member states and civil society. In this latter group there are varying degrees 
and reasons for resistance. That is not conceivable within Barnett and Finnemore’s 
(2004) theoretical framework, where IOs and member states are depicted as unitary, 
rational actors. My findings therefore support Weaver’s (2008) view of IOs as a 
myriad of actors and units pursuing their own interests, as well as Seabrook and 
Tsingou’s (2009) criticism that the principal weakness of Barnett and Finnemore’s 
(2004) approach is that they insufficiently allow for the agency of IO staff. 
The DPKO team also used framing, as explained by Barnett and Finnemore (2004). 
One example is how they reframed the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions from 
a normative to a strategic question to make the Resolutions meaningful to audiences 
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that had earlier been uninterested in or skeptical of the agenda, either because of 
conceptual confusion or due to resistance against women’s empowerment or the 
“protection of civilians” agenda.  
The three strategies were used interdependently and can be seen as moments on a 
continuum. Framing efforts to persuade stakeholders among UN military staff and 
other UN personnel, as well as member states were more effective when they were 
done together with allies from these same groups. To persuade some representatives 
from the military and member states, this was in fact the only way to have legitimacy. 
Persistence would likewise not have been effective had it not been for the growing 
number of supporters among NGOs and member states and the increased media 
attention to the horrendous war rapes in the DRC, which changed the political and 
normative landscape of the Gender Team’s advocacy. The DPKO staff’s efforts were, 
in other words, aided by other stakeholders, such as staff from other parts of the 
DPKO, military and civilian staff in peacekeeping missions, members of the NGO 
community and member states supporting the Women, Peace, and Security agenda. 
This stands in contrast to the constructivist perspective that focuses on framing as the 
only tool IOs can make use of to influence member states and other stakeholders. I will 
elaborate on this criticism later in the chapter. 
The informants’ descriptions clearly show that other stakeholders also restricted the 
DPKO team’s actions. The DPKO team had to work for a long time to gain permission 
from the DPKO leadership and member states to initiate the Gender Guidelines. To 
develop the guidelines, they depended on member states for funding and continued 
political support. Military and civilian staff at the DPKO, from peacekeeping missions 
and the TCCs also had much influence over the development process. The opinions of 
all these stakeholders strongly affected the final gender guidelines.  
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6.2 The Possibilities and Limits to the Agency of DPKO Staff  
In this section, I turn to the theoretical research question asking in what ways member 
states influence the actions of IO staff and whether IO staff can act independently from 
them.  
The DPKO staff repeatedly stated that the UN was “owned” by the member states and 
that they determined the priorities of the staff. However, as described above the DPKO 
team made use of several strategies to pursue the military gender guidelines despite 
initial opposition from many member states. This would suggest that the DPKO have 
agency and interests independent from those of states.  
Unlike neorealists/neo-liberals view of IO staff’s actions as automatic responses to the 
interests and instructions of states, my findings suggest that the member states are 
highly influential, but do not fully determine the DPKO staff’s interests and actions. 
According to Lipson (2007a), the member states influence the UN by being a part of 
the organization’s formal structure, as well as being its most important source of 
legitimacy and funding. His description is clearly echoed in my informants’ 
descriptions in that the DPKO team first needed the member states’ permission and 
funding to be able to initiate the development of the military gender guidelines. Later 
in the process, representatives from central TCCs and other member states reviewed 
and altered drafts of the guidelines. This was necessary because TCCs employ, supply 
and provide most of the training for UN military troops, and are thereby responsible 
for central tenets of the Resolutions, such as increasing the number of female 
peacekeepers and the pre-deployment gender training. Member states also funded and 
provided political support for the process. In other words, their approval of the 
guidelines was necessary if they were to be implemented. The inclusions of central 
TCCs also legitimized the guidelines in the eyes of other TCCs and member states, 
and other parts of the DPKO. Lipson (2007a) designates member states as the primary 
source of legitimacy for the UN. However, both the Gender Team and the informants 
among Norwegian bureaucrats included other groups as important sources of 
legitimacy for the DPKO team’s work. They especially pointed to representatives from 
the NGO community and other parts of the UN, such as high-level military and 
77 
 
civilian personnel from peacekeeping missions. Certain types of experience gave the 
holders’ opinions additional credibility, such as a military background or experience 
from the field. Consulting with military and civilian peacekeepers from existing 
missions consequently served to increase the legitimacy of the final guidelines in the 
eyes of the implementing stakeholders in the field and among TCCs and donor 
countries.  
Some of the Norwegian scholars and bureaucrats interviewed for this thesis suggested 
that the conflicting demands of the different stakeholders contributed to a toothless and 
vague set of finished guidelines. The interviewees from the DPKO did not corroborate 
this view. Rather, they argued that without this inclusive process aimed at creating 
ownership and legitimacy to the guidelines among the central stakeholders and making 
sure that the guidelines were politically, economically and practically feasible, they 
would have been without much practical value, as they would not have been 
implemented in practice.  
My findings do not, on the other hand, support Lipson’s (2007a) depiction of the UN 
as a unitary structure, without much room for the agency of UN personnel. The lack of 
coordination and disagreement between the different UN agencies when it comes to 
the implementation of the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions, confirms 
Weaver’s (2008) and Brunsson’s (2002) argument that organizations should not be 
analyzed as unitary entities. Rather, they are comprised of a number of units and 
agents, all with distinct interests and agendas.  
 
6.2.1 The Dangers of Overemphasizing Framing as a Strategy 
While my findings coincides with Barnett and Finnemore’s (2004) and Weaver’s 
(2008) portrayal of IO staff as agents strategically working to advance their agendas, 
they do not correspond with Barnett and Finnemore’s (2004) singular focus on framing 
as a strategy to influence other stakeholders, disregarding the importance of alliances 
and changes in the normative context outside of IO staff’s control. According to this 
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perspective, whether framing efforts are successful depend only on the IO’s authority 
in the relationship with the stakeholder it is trying to influence and whether the actor’s 
strategic interests or other stakeholders with more situational authority do not 
contradict this authority. The result is that successful framing efforts always seem like 
the result of the framers’ persuasive power and authority. While the DPKO team 
succeeded in creating military gender guidelines this might not have been the case if 
framing was the only available strategy, because on its own, the DPKO team could 
influence some, but not all, of the stakeholder determining the outcome.  
This is probably because compared to the IOs portrayed by Barnett and Finnemore 
(2004) the DPKO team had much less authority vis-à-vis the audiences they had to 
convince. Following the definitions provided by Barnett & Finnemore (2004) 
successful framing of the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions when it comes to 
military peacekeepers would imply establishing that they are important and relevant 
for military peacekeepers, describing what military peacekeepers should do to 
implement them, who military contingents should be composed of and so on. The 
actual implementation of these instructions would then be carried out by OMA, the 
military contingents in missions and the TCCs. According to Barnett and Finnemore 
(2004) these audiences would comply if the DPKO team had rational-legal, moral, 
expert or delegated authority. In the beginning of the process, few of the authorizing or 
implementing agencies and actors thought the Women, Peace and Security agenda was 
important or they outright disagreed to its central tenets. The combined lobbying effort 
of member states, the NGO community and various UN agencies provided the DPKO 
Gender Team with permission to create guidelines, not the efforts of the Gender Unit 
alone. Moreover, the necessity of reframing the Resolutions from a normative to a 
strategic agenda indicates that the DPKO team did not have moral authority that 
trumped the reservations of the stakeholders. While the DPKO team had been 
delegated the responsibility of writing the guidelines and coordinating the validation 
and review process, the demands for revisions by member states and military and 
civilian field personnel, indicate that while the team was seen as experts on gender, 
other types of expertise, such as field experience or military expertise was considered 
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more important. Among many military peacekeepers, military experience was needed 
to give weight to the DPKO team’s arguments. The team’s solution to their own 
insufficient authority was building alliances with actors who had authority relevant to 
the audiences they were trying to convince. Despite these efforts, the resistance against 
women’s empowerment and the “protection of civilians” agenda could still prevent 
implementation among some TCCs. Continued or increasing division between the 
Resolutions’ advocates can also provide obstacles for effective implementation. 
However, this part of the process has only just begun. 
Barnett and Finnemore’s (2004) constructivist understanding of power and authority 
implies that authority is not fixed or always obeyed. The descriptions of the process of 
developing the military gender guidelines provide just one example of the interactive 
relationship between states and IO personnel. It is possible that IO staff have greater 
authority over other issues and in other situations. Moreover, the contest over who gets 
to frame the implications of the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions for military 
peacekeepers is not over, and the relative levels of authority between the DPKO team 
and the other implementing stakeholders might yet change. However, the alliance 
building that went into creating military gender guidelines at the DPKO also 
demonstrates that competition over framing attempts is not really between the DPKO 
on the one hand and member states on the other. Rather, alliances and opposition cut 
across the institutional divisions and the DPKO could “borrow” authority from more 
powerful stakeholders in order to advance their agenda. As such, whether or not IO 
staff have authority in their own right to influence how member states perceive and act 
on a specific issue, might not be that important. 
These conclusions suggest that the explanation provided by the critics as to why the 
implementation process has been belated lacks central components, which will be laid 
out below. 
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6.3 Considering the Criticism against the Implementation Process  
As outlined in the background chapter the critics consider the implementation process 
to be inefficient, hampered by bias against gender issues, organizational inertia and a 
lack of coordination and a normative consensus regarding the Women, Peace, and 
Security agenda and peacekeeping more generally in the UN organization. Other 
critics also argue that the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions themselves are 
insufficiently feminist and peace oriented. They especially react to the portrayal of the 
Resolutions as tools to help the UN more effectively perform other tasks.  
The DPKO interviewees corroborate several of these explanatory factors as to why the 
implementation process is moving slowly, resulting in discrepancies between the 
organization’s rhetoric and practice. The informants’ descriptions highlight ignorance 
of or dissent to the importance of gender issues, inadequate funding and personnel, 
coordination difficulties between the different UN agencies and a general lack of 
normative consensus and political will in their explanations to why it was initially 
difficult to get the development process going. However, rather than taking the 
obstacles and resistance as a given, the DPKO gender unit worked to change them 
through various strategies. The alliance of member states, NGOs and UN agencies 
managed to get gender issues acknowledged as being important by an increasing 
number of member states and UN personnel. The DPKO team contributed this work in 
their own organization and among TCCs by reframing the Women, Peace, and 
Security Resolutions as a strategic, rather than a normative question. Combined with 
persistent lobbying, this contributed to slowly decreasing the conceptual confusion and 
increasing the perception of the Women, Peace, and Security agenda as important 
among military personnel and TCCs. However, these strategies also required much 
pragmatism and willingness to compromise regarding the final guidelines.  
The lack of coordination between UN agencies remains a problem according to several 
of my informants. The ad-hoc nature of funding also makes the gender efforts at the 
DPKO vulnerable to changes in the member states’ priorities, although there is no 
longer a lack of willing donors to these issues, at least at the headquarters level. In 
contrast to the analysis in the critical literature, my findings demonstrate that the 
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DPKO is open to implementing the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions, and 
have made some progress, but that this is a slow, step-by-step process.  
The informants also stress how much the different member states influenced all stages 
of the development process of the military gender guidelines, not only by controlling 
whether they got made, but also by reviewing and altering the guidelines themselves. 
While Anderlini (2007) includes an analysis of how women’s empowerment and the 
“protection of civilians” agenda affected the implementation process, these political 
struggles are portrayed as more relevant for the implementation by member states than 
for the process in the UN. My findings suggest that these reservations also had great 
implications for the DPKO. In fact, rather than being a closed and static system, the 
DPKO can be described as an arena where actors from the UN system, the member 
states and the NGO community attempt to advance their own agendas and 
understanding of central political questions, including the Women, Peace, and Security 
agenda and the role and responsibilities of peacekeepers. While UNSCR 1325 was 
adopted unanimously in 2000, the struggle to define its meaning, its significance, how 
it should influence practice and how it relates to other issues is still going on. This may 
play out differently in the various departments and agencies of the UN, but at the 
DPKO member states have decisive influence over this framing process. The neglect 
to include this in the critical literature’s analysis is also surprising considering the 
well-known political struggle that was behind the adaptation of UNSCR 1325, the 
initial Women, Peace, and Security Resolution. To argue that pressure from member 
states severely watered down the final Resolutions, while at the same time not 
allowing for the possibility that this may influence the implementation process as some 
of these writers do, is inconsistent. I would argue that the implementation of these 
Resolutions at the DPKO and in peacekeeping operations cannot be understood 
without analyzing the organization’s integrated relationship with its member states and 
the rest of its political environment, including the activist community. It is in other 
words the same kind of compromises that went into placing gender issues on the 
agenda of the Security Council, alienating the more radical women’s peace activists, 
that contributed to the slow implementation process at the DPKO. 
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Accordingly, while my informants corroborate much of the criticism waged at the 
implementation process, the critics fail to see these restrictions and obstacles as a 
starting point for negotiation, rather than a final outcome and moreover do not take the 
member states’ and other actors’ role in the process sufficiently into consideration.  
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7. Conclusion 
On the basis of the discussion in the previous chapter, I conclude that my findings 
have both theoretical implications and suggestions regarding the advocacy of the 
Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions. 
 
7.1. Theoretical Implications 
The actions of the DPKO staff are not automatic responses to the interests and 
instructions of the UN member states. However, states have great influence on their 
work, both through their control of the DPKO’s funding, formal priorities and as 
important sources of legitimacy. Donor countries and TCCs had a lot of influence on 
the final DPKO/DFS gender guidelines and the consideration for the member states’ 
and the other stakeholders’ wishes determined much of the development process. The 
member states are, on the other hand, not a homogeneous group. Among the member 
states, there were both skeptics and supporters of the Women, Peace, and Security 
Resolutions. Moreover, their stances were often pliable and the DPKO team used a 
number of strategies to win over new supporters. The team did not, however, have the 
authority to push this agenda without the help of their allies from both within and 
without the UN, even though they perceived their advocacy as an important 
contribution. This particular team and process is consequently not as powerful as the 
IOs and its staff depicted by the constructivist perspective on the IO-state relationship. 
However, Barnett and Finnemore (2004) stress that the authority of IOs depends on the 
issue, context and actors and consequently my findings do not contradict their analysis.  
Both neorealists/neo-liberalists and constructivists use an analytical framework that 
discern sharply between IOs and member states. The interviewees and the completed 
gender guidelines contrastingly describes the DPKO as an arena where the member 
states are highly influential and integrated into formal decision making structures, 
much along the lines of the UN depicted in Lipson’s (2007a) analysis. Differentiating 
so zealously might lead these perspectives to overlook how actors from both sides of 
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the IO-state division cooperate and make use of each other’s authority to advance 
common agendas, which is crucial when analyzing organizational change and 
advocacy of norms such as the Women, Peace, and Security agenda. 
 
7.2 Implications for Activists 
The process of implementing the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions at the 
DPKO is moving slowly forward. While the critics of this process have argued that 
this is a result of organizational features and attitudes within the organization itself, 
this thesis holds that it is also because the implementation process is permeated by the 
stakeholders from the UN organization, peacekeeping missions and especially the 
member states. Consequently, implementing the Women, Peace, and Security 
Resolutions at the DPKO implies changing attitudes, culture and practice not only 
within the DPKO, but also those of the member states and military personnel in 
peacekeeping missions and at the DPKO headquarters in New York. If implementation 
is to happen at all, the process must be considered legitimate to these stakeholders, 
who fund and implement the agenda in practice. Their involvement has and will 
probably continue to make this a painstakingly slow process and also influence what 
the outcome will look like.  
The DPKO staff working to implement the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions, 
relies on supporters and allies in order to move this process forward. As such, 
fragmentation and lack of coordination of the alliance advocating this agenda from 
within and without the UN, could pose an equally great obstacle for effective 
implantation as bias against gender issues and organizational features within the UN 
and resistance from some member states.  
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Appendix I: Organizational Map of the DPKO and DFS 
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Appendix II: Interview Guide 
Common topics for all interviews: 
• The criticism against the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security 
agenda at the UN/DPKO  
• Possible obstacles to the implementation process  
• The relationship between the DPKO and the TCCs and other important 
stakeholders, such as donor countries and the NGO community  
• Gender perspectives as important to the operational efficiency of military 
peacekeepers 
 
 Additional topics for interviews with current and former DPKO personnel 
• Would you mind telling me about your own professional background before 
you came to the DPKO? 
• Can you tell me about the process of creating the gender guidelines? 
• What was your role in this process? 
• How was other stakeholders such as the TCCs and field missions involved in 
this process? 
• How do you work to influence TCCs and military actors to adopt a gender 
perspective? 
• Pragmatism/Gender as added value to peacekeeping missions/speaking so that 
people with a military background will understand your perspective 
• Are there any parts of the Women, Peace and Security agenda that is especially 
controversial among your partners? If so, how do you try to promote these 
issues? 
Not all of these topics/questions were brought up at every interview. In most interviews 
I also included three or four specific questions tailored to the particular informant. 
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Appendix III a: Letter to Informants (English) 
Thank you very much for being willing to participate in this interview. 
The interviews will provide the most important source of data for my Master’s 
thesis, which I am currently writing as a part of my Master’s degree in Peace and 
Conflict Studies at the University of Oslo, Norway. I am also a student fellow and 
research assistant at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI).  
In my thesis, I examine how the Department of Peace Keeping Operation’s Gender 
Team (DPKO) works to implement the Security Council Resolutions on women, 
peace and security. More specifically, I focus on how the DPKO work with troop 
contributing countries, donor countries, as well as other parts of the UN to achieve 
this objective. I also wish to understand how the Gender Team perceives their own 
influence over this process. 
I will ask you at the beginning of the interview for permission to record our 
conversation, so that nothing of importance will be missed. These recordings will 
later be transcribed. Both the recording and the transcription will be destroyed after 
the thesis is completed and graded. The finished thesis will, however, be accessible 
at the university library, as well as published on the internet. 
My aim is to preserve the anonymity of the people I interview for this thesis. No 
names of interviewees will appear either in my notes, or in the recorded or 
transcribed interviews. Beside myself, the only one who will have access to this 
material is the external examiner for my thesis. However, as the DPKO gender team 
numbers few people, full anonymity may be difficult to achieve. If it is important to 
you that the whole or parts of the interview be completely untraceable, I will take 
extra precautions. Should to wish to, you will also have final approval of all direct 
quotes I make use of in my text. 
Participation in this interview is entirely voluntary and you may terminate the 
interview at any point. If there are questions you would rather not answer, that is 
fine.   
The interview will last approximately 45 minutes, but I am flexible if this is 
inconvenient to you. 
If you have questions regarding me or my project, please do not hesitate to contact 
me. 
 
Rikke Elisabeth Hennum 
Student Fellow 
Norwegian Institue of International Affairs (NUPI) 
Department of Security and Conflict Management 
Mobile: (+47) 917 12 161 
E-mail: rhe@nupi.no 
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Appendix III b: Letter to Informants (Norwegian) 
Først vil jeg benytte anledningen til å takke for at du stiller opp til intervju.   
Dette intervjuet blir en del av datamaterialet til den avsluttende oppgaven jeg skriver som 
en del av mastergraden min i Peace and Conflict Studies ved Universitet i Oslo. Jeg er 
også studentstipendiat ved Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt (NUPI). 
Målet med masteroppgaven er å få oversikt over hvordan ansatte i FNs Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations’ (DPKO) Gender Team arbeider med implementeringen av 
FNs sikkerhetsråds resolusjoner om kvinner, fred og sikkerhet. Jeg ønsker særlig å 
fokusere på hvordan DPKO samarbeider med troppebidragsland, donorland, samt andre 
deler av FN-byråkratiet for å oppnå dette. Jeg vil også undersøke hvordan medlemmene i 
Gender Teamet ser sin egen inflytelse på denne prosessen. 
For ikke å gå glipp av viktige momenter i intervjuet vil jeg be deg om å få gjøre 
lydopptak av samtalen vår. Disse opptakene vil bli transkribert. Både opptakene og 
transkripsjonen vil slettes når oppgaven er levert og sensur er gitt. Den ferdige oppgaven 
vil være tilgjengelig på universitetets bibliotek, samt publiseres på internett. 
Jeg vil gjøre mitt beste for å bevare anonymiteten til de som lar seg intervjue til denne 
oppgaven. Hverken mine notater, lydopptaket eller transkripsjonen vil derfor inneholde 
navnet på den som blir intervjuet. Miljøet som arbeider med spørsmål innenfor kvinner, 
fred og sikkerhet er på den annen side så lite at full anonymitet kan bli vanskelig å 
oppnå. Dersom det er viktig for deg at alt eller deler av du forteller under intervjuet ikke 
kan spores tilbake til deg, vil jeg ta spesielt hensyn til dette i den videre skriveprosessen. 
Dersom det er ønskelig er det selvsagt mulig å ta sitatsjekk. Du kan også unnlate å svare 
på enkeltspørsmål eller avslutte intervjuet når du måtte ønske. 
Intervjuet vil vare rundt 45 minutter. 
Dersom du skulle ha flere spørsmål om meg eller prosjektet, så ikke nøl med å ta 
kontakt. 
 
Med vennlig hilsen,  
 
Rikke Elisabeth Hennum 
Studentstipendiat 
Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt  (NUPI) 
Avdeling for sikkerhet og konflikthåndtering 
Mobil: (+47) 917 12 161 
E-post: rhe@nupi.no 
 
